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In today's world of private information and mass communication, there is an ever 
increasing need for  new methods of maintaining and protecting privacy and integrity of 
information.  This thesis attempts to combine the chaotic world of cellular automata and 
the paranoid world of cryptography to enhance  the S-box of many Substitution 
Permutation Network (SPN) ciphers, specifically Rijndael/AES.  The success of this 
enhancement is measured in terms of security and performance. 
The results show that it is possible to use Cellular Automata (CA) to enhance the 
security of an  8-bit S-box by further randomizing the structure.  This secure use of CA to 
scramble the S-box, removes the "9-term algebraic expression" [20] [21] that typical 
Galois generated S-boxes share.  This cryptosystem securely uses a Margolis class, 
partitioned block, uniform gas, cellular automata to create unique S-boxes for each block 
of data to be processed.   
The system improves the base Rijndael algorithm in the following ways.  First, it 
utilizes a new S-box for each block of data.  This effectively limits the amount of data 
that can be gathered for statistical analysis to the blocksize being used.  Secondly, the    
S-boxes are not stored in the compiled binary, which protects against an "S-box 
blanking" [22] attack.  Thirdly, the algebraic expression hidden within each galois 
generated S-box is destroyed after one CA generation, which also modifies key 
expansion results.  Finally, the thesis succeeds in combining Cellular Automata and 
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Since their conception by Stanislaw Ulam and John von Neumann in the 1940's 
[1], researchers have successfully utilized Cellular Automata (CA) for many different 
purposes.  The simple structure and the properties of CA suggest various uses in many 
fields of study.  However, it has proven quite difficult to integrate CA with the field of 
cryptography.  Despite previous results, new uses for CA in cryptographic applications 
are often investigated.  This thesis will attempt to enhance the security of the Rijndael 
encryption algorithm by using the perceived performance and randomness of CA to 
modify the typically static S-Box structure.  While the strength of the existing Rijndael 
algorithm may not reside entirely with the S-Box, research suggests room for 
improvement in both implementation and the design of S-Box dependent algorithms. 
The thesis will consist of three main chapters each having several sub chapters.  
The introduction will provide relevant background information over the topics of Cellular 
Automata and cryptography. The typical operation of common types of CA will be 
explained, as well as their perceived uses in cryptography.  Similarly, common 
cryptographic networks and primitives, like the S-Box, will be introduced.  This first 
chapter will finally provide a look at some previously proposed Cellular Automata 
Cryptosystems (CACs) and their shortcomings. 
The second chapter of the thesis will focus on the design and implementation of 
the proposed system.  The proposal integrates two separate systems into one and was 
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designed similarly.  In the first part of the second chapter, the Rijndael algorithm is 
explained.  This section details the structures and operations that work together to make 
Rijndael a secure algorithm.  The chapter then explains the S-Box modifying CA.  The 
design and operation of the CA as well as its properties and selection criteria are 
rationalized.  The chapter finally shows the integration of the two parts, as the proposal 
suggests. 
The proposed CAC is analyzed in the third chapter based on a number of criteria.  
The two halves of the CAC, the cipher and the CA, are analyzed independently to verify 
their operation and fulfillment of their selection criteria.  Finally, the combined system is 
evaluated based on strength of the generated S-Boxes, the security of the implementation, 
and the processing performance.  The final results of the analysis lead to the conclusion 
that the CAC operates correctly, offers improvements to Rijndael's S-Box, and has a 
moderate impact on performance. 
1.1. Cellular Automata 
Cellular Automata typically exist on a finite or infinite regular grid of cells.  Each 
cell, or automata, has a finite number of possible states.  These automata cells are each 
modified independently by the transition function on a discrete time step.  The 
application of the transition function to each cell in the grid leads to the next 'generation' 
for the grid.  Transition functions typically operate based on the state of the cell and the 
cells around it.  Though these functions depend on their input states, every cell follows 




1.1.1. CA Dimensions. 
The dimensions defined by d could be described as NxxNyxNz, where (Nx, Ny, Nz) 
are members of the natural numbers.  Typically CA are limited to one or two dimensions 
(Nz = 0) and a finite size for the dimensions Nx and Ny.  In an attempt to emulate an 
infinite grid, the border cells typically have their neighbors wrap to the other side of the 
grid, creating a Nz-dimensional torus [2], as shown in the image [3] in Figure 1.   
 
1.1.2. CA States. 
The finite set of states S = (S0, S1, …, Sn-1) where n is the size of the set S.  Most 
CA based on Margolus's Lattice Gas Automata or Conway's Game of Life will have only 
two states.  For Lattice Gas Automata, the two states are seen as the existence or 
non-existence of a particle.  In Conway's Game of Life, the two states indicate whether a 
cell is alive or dead.  Few automata have more than two states, as the design complexity 
 
 
Figure 1.  Toroidal result of wrapping borders of a 2-D plane. [3] 
CA = (d, S, N, ƒ) 
where d = is a triple determining the size of dimensions 
S = the finite set of possible states 
N = the neighborhood vector for each cell 
ƒ = the local transition function 
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of the transition function ƒ increases with the number of states.  The transition function ƒ 
transforms a cell's state to another state based on its current state and its neighbor's states 
defined by N.  The combined states of the cells in the neighborhood is called the 
configuration.  The number of possible configurations for a neighborhood depends on the 
size of the state set S and the number of cells in neighborhood N, which amounts to SN 
total configurations for a specific CA.   
1.1.3. CA Neighborhoods. 
For the standard 2-dimensional cellular automaton on a square grid, there are 
three standard choices of neighborhood vector N.  Edward F. Moore proposed one 
method [4] for defining neighborhoods.  A Moore neighborhood of range r is defined by 
NMoore(x0,y0,r) = [(x, y) : |x – x0| ≤ r, |y - y0| ≤ r], and the number of cells in each 
neighborhood is (2r + 1)2.  A r value of one is typically used which yields eight 
neighbors to each cell, for a total of nine cells in the Moore neighborhood as seen in 
Figure 2a.  The Moore neighbor-hooding scheme is used in John Conway's Game of Life, 
and many related CA [2].  The second most common scheme is the von Neumann 
neighborhood [5].  A von Neumann neighborhood of range r is defined by 
NvonNeumann(x0,y0,r) = [(x, y) : |x – x0| + |y - y0| ≤ r], and the number of cells in each 
neighborhood is 2r(r + 1) + 1.  A range of one is typically used which yields four 
neighbors to each cell, for a total of five cells in the von Neumann neighborhood, as seen 




 The third common neighborhood is quite a bit different.  Designed to model 
physical systems (Lattice Gases [6]), the Margolus neighborhood has the smallest 
neighborhood with just 4 members.  However, Margolus neighborhood automata operate 
with an alternating partitioning scheme [7].  The 2x2 partitioning scheme effectively 
groups four cells together into what can be looked at as a macro-cell.  Figure 2c. shows 
the neighbors of the central cell with the alternating partitions indicated by the odd and 
even labels.  Without the alternating partitioning scheme, transitions between 
configurations would not propagate beyond the individual partitions [7].  In a Margolus 
neighborhood based CA, the states of the four cells in the macro-cell indicate the current 
configuration of that macro-cell.  For Margolus automata, the current configuration of the 
  xx,yy-1   
xx-1,yy xx,yy xx+1,yy 
  xx,yy+1   
Figure 2b. 
von Neumann Neighborhood with r = 1. 
xx-1,yy-1 xx,yy-1 xx+1,yy-1 
xx-1,yy xx,yy xx+1,yy 
xx-1,yy+1 xx,yy+1 xx+1,yy+1 
Figure 2a. 
Moore Neighborhood with r = 1. 
Odd       
xx-1,yy-1 
Odd  
xx,yy-1   










Alternating Margolus Neighborhood 
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macro-cell is seen as the state, and the transition function works on macro-cells as 
opposed to individual cells.  The number of possible configurations for these two 
dimensional neighborhoods are S(2r+1)^2, S2r(r + 1) + 1, and 24 for Moore, von Neumann, and 
Margolus neighborhoods respectively. 
For all neighbor-hooding schemes, the wrapping of border cells must be taken 
into consideration when determining the indices of the neighbors of the central cell  [2].  
Most software implementations of CA elect to emulate an infinite grid of cells by 
wrapping the borders. Formally, calculating the index for a neighbor could be described 
as a modulo operation.  For example, the neighbor of the Nx±1'th cell would be written as 
N(x±1)%Nx where % represents the arithmetic modulo operation, requiring that  
mod(-1,32)=31 for example.  Figure 3 illustrate this idea for the Moore neighborhood 
with range r = 1.   
 
 Though most software implementations of 2-dimensional Cellular Automata wrap 
the borders of the grid, special precautions must be taken for hardware implementations.  
In hardware, each CA cell would be an identical circuit.  The cells would each have 
connections to their neighbors.  Connecting each border cell to the other side of the grid 
would increase the cost and scalability of the implementation.  As such, it is often 
x(x-1)%Nx,y(y-1)%Ny xx,y(y-1)%Ny x(x+1)%Nx,y(y-1)%Ny 
x(x-1)%Nx,yy xx,yy x(x+1)%Nx,yy 
x(x-1)%Nx,y(y+1)%Ny xx,y(y+1)%Ny x(x+1)%Nx,y(y+1)%Ny 
Figure 3. 
Moore Neighborhood indexing with wrapping of borders. 
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advised that CA systems destined for hardware take this into account [2].  Because the 
operation of the CA still requires that each cell have the same neighborhood, some 
special-case null-value must be chosen as transition functions for those non-existent 
neighbors to avoid leaking information in or out of the CA grid. 
1.1.4. CA Transition Function. 
The last member of the 4-tuple, the local transition function ƒ, defines the 
behavior of the automata.  ƒ is directly dependent upon the number of states and the 
chosen neighbor-hooding scheme.  Let Snx,y denote the current state of the cell in a 




Snx,y → Sn+1x,y  
Let Gridc be the current configuration of the entire grid.  After applying the local 
transition function ƒ to all cells in the field, the global transition function F evolves [2], 
changing Gridc into GridFn. 
F : GridFc → GridFn   
When choosing ƒ for applications that are information preserving, it must be 
specially crafted to avoid destroying information.  For example, in Conway's Game of 
Life, which has a Moore neighborhood with range r = 1, a living cell with zero neighbors 
will die, or transition from state 1 to state 0.  Since there are no complimentary rules for 
the spontaneous birth of a cell, Conway's rules are not information preserving.  For some 
cryptographic purposes (i.e. not random pattern generation), ƒ must be designed to be 
injective.  The injective property simply requires that all inputs to the function have 
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specific outputs.  If the CA state values are based on its current neighborhood 
configuration, as opposed to an aggregate sum of neighbors, then creating one-to-one 
functions that preserve all information is simplified.  Injective transition functions 
inherently imply the existence of the inverse of ƒ, ƒ-1, which defines F-1 as the inverse 
operation on the entire grid field.  F is reversible if and only if F is a bijection. [2]  If a 
CA requires reversible rules, then the function ƒ must be its own inverse.  For example, if 
configuration (or state) 'A' is changed to 'B', then 'B' must also change to 'A'.  A CA with 
a bijective function ƒ can be described as a reversible cellular automata or RCA.   
1.1.5. Example of a Cellular Automata. 
The standard example of cellular automata is John Conway's Game of Life.  This 
automata uses a Moore neighborhood with r = 1, giving eight total neighbors to each cell 
for a total of nine in a neighborhood.  The transition function is based on the number of 
'living' neighbors and the state of the current cell.  Under Conway's rules, if a dead cell 
has exactly three neighbors, it will be born; if a live cell has two or three, neighbors it 
survives to the next generation; in all other cases, the cell dies.  Formally, Conway's 
Game of Life can be described as a 4-tuple CA = (d, S, N, ƒ).  
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Figure 4 illustrates five generations of Conway's rules with grey tiles representing 
the living cells (cells in state 1) and the numbers indicating the count of living neighbors 
for the chosen cell.  During each generation, every cell counts the number of living 
neighbors in its neighborhood.  Next, the local transition function is applied to each cell, 
which determines the next state of the cell based on its current state and its' living 
neighbor count.  From the first randomly selected generation shown in Figure 4, all the 
non-living white cells with a value of three (indicating the number of living neighbors) 
will be born in the next generation.  In the second generation, all the cells with the values 
four and five will die in the next generation, in addition to the usual births.  The map 




Gen:  1                   2                     3                    4                      5 
Figure 4. 5 Generations under Conway's rules.  Numbers show the 
living neighbor counts of the cell, grey cells are living. 
d = (Nx, Ny, Nz) = (X, Y, 0) where X and Y are natural numbers. 
S = {0,1} with 0 and 1 representing dead and living cells respectively. 
N = NMoore,1 a Moore neighborhood with range 1. 
ƒ = is described by the following table. 
 
 




Cryptography is the process of encoding and scrambling data for confidentiality 
purposes.  The strength of a cryptographic algorithm (cipher) is not specifically in the 
algorithm itself; instead, its strength is determined by the 'secret keys' and the type of 
network used (SPN, feistel, data-dependent rotations) [8].  The most basic way of 
differentiating cryptographic algorithms is by the number of keys used.  A symmetric key 
cipher requires only a single key to encrypt the user's data.  This single key is mixed into 
the data in such a way that the same key is used to undo the mixing.  This property 
implies that the way in which the key is mixed is its own inverse, and most likely the 
XOR operation described later.  The second basic type of cipher uses two keys to do its 
work.  These are typically called public-key cryptosystems.  The operation of such 
two-key asymmetric ciphers are fundamentally different from their single-key cousins.  
Besides providing confidentiality of data, these asymmetric ciphers also offer integrity 
checking and verification of author for non-repudiation.  Focusing on symmetric ciphers, 




1.2.1. Types of Ciphers. 
There are a few main structures to crypto algorithms in use today.  They all seek 
to create what Claude Shannon calls "confusion and diffusion" of the input data [9].  
Diffusion is the process of scrambling and swapping bits among bytes within a block of 
data.  This is typically done before a confusion step.  On the other hand, Confusion is 
performed by byte substitutions, meaning each byte is replaced by a different byte.  An 
advantage of feistel networks is that their design is nearly identical for encryption and 
decryption, only requiring the key-schedule to be reversed.  Figure 5a illustrates a 
simplified process of encrypting and decrypting a plaintext block [10].  For encryption, 
the block is split into two halves.  One of the halves is processed by the function F.  This 
function F performs the diffusion and confusion of the data, using whichever method the 
feistel cipher has chosen.  Next, either as another step or as part of the function F, a 
portion of the key K is mixed into the data with an XOR.  The resulting half block is 
XORed with the other half, and the process continues this way.  The two half blocks 
 
Figure 5a. A Feistel Network [10] 
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swap positions, and continue utilizing F and K until the entire key has been used.  For 
decryption, the exact same algorithm is used, but the key stream is reversed. 
 
Substitution Permutation Network (SPN) ciphers, like Rijndael, borrow a lot from 
the mixing functions of Feistel ciphers.  However, the encryption and decryption 
processes differ by more than a simple key reversal.  Rijndael consists of steps that mix 
the key, substitute bytes using an S-box, shift rows within the block and then mix 
columns within each block (Figure 5b)  [11].  Figure 5b, shows each of the confusion and 
diffusion steps used in the SPN cipher, in no particular order.  The first confusion step in 
 
XOR Key and State (Confusion) 
 
Substitute Bytes of State (Confusion) 
 
Shift Rows of State (Diffusion) 
 
MixColumns of State (Diffusion) 
Figure 5b. The four steps of AES, a SPN Cipher [12] 
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the figure shows how the plaintext block, or state, is XORed with some of the Key.  This 
is represented as MatA ⊕ MatK = MatB.  The second step shown in Figure 5b shows the 
second confusion step, called SubBytes, which is used in Rijndael and similar SPN 
ciphers.  This process uses an S-Box to produce unique outputs for each input.  The next 
step in the figure is simply the ShiftRow diffusion step, which deterministically rotates 
rows in the state, which move bits from their original location in the state.  The second 
diffusion step illustrated in Figure 5b, is the MixColumns function.  This function uses 
matrix multiplication in the Galois field to diffuse bits within each column among all four 
column entries.  Thus, for an SPN cipher like Rijndael, confusion and diffusion functions 
(and their inverses) work together and in a certain order to provide security.  The SPN 
decryption process differs from the encryption in that only the inverse functions are 
called and in the opposite order, which makes designing SPN ciphers slightly more 
involved than a Feistel cipher. 
The S-box, mentioned above, is the heart of most SPN ciphers and responsible for 
a large amount of the confusion aspect of the cipher.  S-Box is a term that simply means 
substitution box.  An 8-bit S-box contains 256 unique entries: one for each of the 256 
8-bit numbers.  The input byte is used as an index into the table, and the value at that 
index is the substitution value.  To undo the substitutions indicated by the S-box, there 
must also be an inverse S-box.  These boxes must stay in sync (remain inverts) for 
encryption and decryption to work. 
 
A B A ⊕ B 
T T F 
T F T 
F T T 
F F F 
Table 2.  Truth table for XOR operation. 
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1.2.2. Basic Boolean Operations. 
Both SPN and Feistel networks (and nearly all ciphers in existence) depend 
heavily on the XOR operation to do most of their invertible operations.  XOR (⊕), which 
means Exclusive OR, is a Boolean operation that results in true if and only if one of the 
inputs is true (Table 2).  This exclusive disjunction allows two pieces of data to be mixed 
invertibly as long as one of the original pieces of information is known.  Thus, if A ⊕ B = 
C, then C ⊕ B = A, and C ⊕ A = B (Figure 6).  At the simplest level, all encryption 
algorithms XOR the plaintext and the key together to get the cipher text.  This naïve 
example has the obvious problem that if an attacker were able to guess the content of a 
plaintext block, they could retrieve the encryption key.  Thus, algorithms have diffusion 
aspects as well.  These properties and the performance of bit-level operations make XOR 
a perfect fit with cryptographic applications. 
A 10010011  C 00100111  C 00100111 
B 10110100  B 10110100  A 10010011 
A ⊕ B = C 00100111  C ⊕ B = A 10010011  C ⊕ A = B 10110100 
Figure 6.  Example of XORs properties with an 8-bit string. 
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1.2.3. Block Cipher Modes of Operation. 
All block ciphers operate on fixed sized chunks of data, or blocks.  Because of 
this, any two identical blocks encrypted under the same key will output the same cipher 
text.  Since this is a flaw inherent in any block cipher, a number of "modes" exist to 
increase the security implementations of block ciphers.  In Electronic Codebook (ECB) 
mode (Figure 7)  [12], each input block is encrypted in turn.  A block of data is first read 
into a buffer.  The encryption algorithm is then performed on that buffer, which mixes the 
key into the data.  This processed block is then output to the cipher text file, and the next 
plaintext block is encrypted in turn.  For example, if you were to encrypt a large image 
with ECB mode, the input blocks for identical regions would show through in the cipher 
text (Figure 8) as per the inherent flaw.  ECB is not recommended for any cryptographic 
implementation because of this reason [13]. 
 
 
Figure 7.  ECB block mode operation [12] 
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 A much better choice of mode for a block cipher is the Cipher Block Chaining 
(CBC) mode.  Figure 9 illustrates this mode.  CBC mode requires an initialization vector 
(IV), which is simply a random block of data that will be XORed with the plaintext 
before encrypting a block.  To create an IV, first fill a block-sized buffer with random 
data from any random number source.  The second step is to encrypt this IV with the 
users' key.  The resulting IV should be uniform random after encryption.  The IV does 
not need to be kept secret; it only needs to be random and never re-used for the same key. 
The initial IV is now ready for use in processing plaintext blocks.  It is used and updated 
exactly as shown in Figure 9 [12].  First, a plaintext block is read in from the file, the 
plaintext block is modified by XORing with the IV.  The block is then encrypted, and the 
IV is set to the values of the encrypted block.  This process continues until the file is 
exhausted.  However, in order to decrypt a file with CBC mode the initial IV needs to be 
stored as the first block in the cipher text. 
 
Scaled Original                                    Scaled RC5 Encrypted ECB                                 Scaled AES CBC 
Figure 8. 
Comparison of ECB and CBC mode for a 6885 x 10000 pixel image.  (Non-Interpolated Post Scaling) 
 17 
The main advantage of CBC over ECB is that all previous blocks affect the 
current block in one way or another [13].  Thus, if a single bit is changed in the first 
block of the file (and the algorithm has good per block avalanche effect), every other 
block will also be changed.  There are other modes for block ciphers like Cipher 
Feedback, Output Feedback, and Counter mode, but most of them focus on creating 
stream ciphers from block ciphers, which is outside of the scope of this thesis. 
 
 
1.2.4. Cryptographic Keys and Keyspace. 
The key itself is one of the most important parts of any algorithm, as it provides 
'instructions' for encrypting and decrypting the data [8].  In any symmetric cryptosystem, 
the key must be kept secret by the user.  Typically, keys range from 64-256 bits, with 
more bits suggesting more security.  The key space is the number of possible keys that 
could be used for input.  For a key of 256 bits, there are 2256 available keys.  The most 
obvious step toward security is removing the possibility for someone to do a brute force 
 
 
Figure 9.  CBC block mode operation [12] 
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attack in which the attacker tries many keys until a plain text matching a known 
distribution is generated.  Statistically, a brute force attack would need to try half of the 
key space before finding a match, or 2(256-1) trials for a 256-bit key.  Due to the enormous 
number of keys to try (Table 3), it is usually computationally infeasible to use brute force 
on most of today's algorithms.   
 
Internally, keys are usually larger than the user supplied key due to key-expansion 
or key-scheduling functions built within a strong cipher [14] [15].  Such key expansion 
functions also serve another important role, by avoiding weak keys.  In some algorithms, 
there exist key patterns that could output part of the message or part of the key in the 
cipher text.  Or even cause no encryption to be done at all.  These key expansion 
algorithms typically do not directly increase key-space, as they are deterministic and 
based on the users small input key.  However, key expansion allows an algorithm to 
perform more rounds of encryption on the data with a different key each time.  In 
Rijndael/AES, key expansion relies on the S-box and is therefore related to the S-boxes 
current configuration, yet it is still deterministic. 
One place that researchers have attempted to integrate CA with Cryptography, is 
in key-expansion.  The authors of [1] [16]  [17] [18] all used one-dimensional CA to 
KeyBits Total Keys Single (1) Distributed (1mil) 
1 2 1.15741E-11 1.15741E-17 
2 4 2.31481E-11 2.31481E-17 
4 16 9.25926E-11 9.25926E-17 
8 256 1.48148E-09 1.48148E-15 
16 65536 3.79259E-07 3.79259E-13 
32 4294967296 0.024855135 2.48551E-08 
64 1.84467E+19 106751991.2 106.7519912 
128 3.40282E+38 1.96923E+27 1.96923E+21 
256 1.15792E+77 6.70093E+65 6.70093E+59 
512 1.3408E+154 7.7591E+142 7.7591E+136 
Table 3.  Relationship between keylength, total keys, and days to test 50% 
of keys at 1 per µs and at 1 per picosecond. 
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generate a key-schedule based on the pseudo-random pattern properties of many                            
one-dimensional CA rules, as illustrated in Figure 10.  Thus, the first line of pixels in 
Figure 10 represents the first generation, or the user supplied key.  Subsequent 
generations provide keys further in the key-schedule, which are claimed to be 
pseudo-random.  While a truly random expanded key would b ideal for encryption (like a 
one-time-pad cipher), pseudo-random is the norm as most algorithms use the 
user-supplied key as an initialization vector for key expansion. 
 
1.2.5. Other Parameters of Encryption Algorithms. 
Many symmetric key ciphers have parameters for the number of rounds, block 
size, word size, and for CA based systems the number of generations.  A user modifiable 
block size, for example, is often a parameter of a good algorithm and allows 
modifications to be made based on memory and time constraints. Typically, a larger 
block size will encrypt faster, but block sizes directly depend on the word size the 
 
Figure 10.  Pseudo-random pattern generation from a 1-D Automata Rule 
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algorithm or user supplies and their architecture.  For example, the RC5 algorithm 
parameterizes word size to allow 16, 32 or 64 bits of data for each entry in the block.  
Providing parameters to the internal workings of the algorithms effectively increase the 
key-space, as the attacker must know these values exactly in order to decrypt a file.  
Another common parameter, the number of rounds, determines the number of times the 
encryption functions are performed on a block of data.  In RC5, this parameter is variable 
from 1-255; in Rijndael, it is typically a function of the key-length but can be 
parameterized.  Increasing the number of rounds increases the convolution of the data.   
1.2.6. Padding Methods for Block Ciphers. 
Any block cipher using ECB or CBC modes must pad the plaintext to fill out the 
block before encryption; the other modes require no padding, as they are stream ciphers.  
If the final block is not padded prior to encryption, then it will not decrypt properly.  One 
typical method of padding suggests filling the first unused byte with 128 (0x80, or 
10000000 binary) and all other bits/bytes with zeros.  The other primary method is to fill 
all Np bytes with the value Np; thus if you have four padding bytes they will all be padded 
with 04, as shown in Figure 11, Case 1, Method 1.  However, there is a problem with this 
scheme.  If the plaintext ends on a block boundary and has the last bytes (0x01) or (0x02, 
0x02), or even (0x03,0x03,0x03) then these bytes will be indistinguishable from padding 
and will be removed as padding.  This is illustrated in Figure 11, Case 2, Method 1.  
Thus, it is highly recommended to add a full block of padding to the cipher text in 
addition to filling out the last block with padding bytes.  In this scheme, all padding bytes 
are filled with the value, Np + BlockSize.  This allows the padding to be properly 
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removed after decryption and is illustrated in Figure 11 in Method 2 for both cases.  This 
method will always work unlike Method 1. 
 
1.2.7. Common Cryptanalysis Techniques. 
Besides ensuring an adequate key space, there are many experimental methods for 
analyzing the general strength of a cipher.  These methods can target weaknesses in the 
algorithmic design, software implementation, or hardware implementations.  The most 
basic test of the algorithm is a data histogram.  After processing a block or file of data, 
there should have been adequate confusion and diffusion to produce a uniform frequency 
                   Case 1                                                    Case 2 
          Padding Needed                                  No Padding Needed 
                 
Message that needs 4 bytes padding.     Message that needs 0 bytes padding. 
 
                 
Method 1. Padding with Np = 04h        Method 1.  Padding with Np = 0h 
Depadding will remove 4 bytes.            Depadding will remove 3 bytes. 
 
                  
Method 2.  Padding with Np = 24h        Method 2.  Padding with Np = 20h 
Depadding will remove 36 bytes.           Depadding will remove 32 bytes. 
 
Figure 11.  Two padding methods. 
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histogram for all byte values, regardless of the plaintext input.  This uniform property is 
necessary to avoid first order language attacks which are based on the probability and 
statistics of the original data, like frequency of letters in the English language.  Obtaining 
this uniformity even with the use of a uniform input key and uniform plaintext is the first 
step to showing a cipher may not be trivially breakable. 
Another property of all modern algorithms is the critical avalanche effect (CAE).  
CAE says that for a single bit change in input byte, at least 50% of bits should change in 
the output byte [2].  In the AES/Rijndael algorithm, this is handled by the diffusion steps, 
namely the ShiftRow and MixColumn operations.  The MixColumn operation 
specifically performs matrix multiplication using a matrix [19] which ensures that every 
byte of the input affects all four bytes of the output.  This method is elegant, and its affine 
property does not weaken the cipher.  These types of operations, coupled with an S-box, 
provide the critical avalanche criterion and byte frequency uniformity.  An algorithm 
design that meets these criteria – in an intelligent order – has the possibility of being a 
secure algorithm. 
Many attacks focus on weaknesses in the implementations of algorithms as 
opposed to the actual design of the algorithm.  For example, in AES and Rijndael 
S-boxes are supposedly generated in such a way so as to have good non-linearity 
properties.  However, According to [20] and [21], the S-boxes generated by Rijndael's 
algorithms only have 9 algebraic terms, which may prove to be vulnerability in the 
design.  It is also suggested in [22] that a static S-box – which most implementations 
store in the binary – allows an attacker to simply modify the binary and discover the 
secret key and plaintext. 
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The authors argue that most implementations of ciphers with static S-boxes are 
vulnerable to blanking, resulting in key discovery.  In addition to their examples and 
proofs of AES's vulnerability to this scheme, they also suggest that all SPN ciphers with 
"Unprotected Implementations, Static S-boxes in cipher round, Key whitening (XOR) 
operation after the final round, A suitable round key expansion," are likely vulnerable to 
S-box Blanking.  In the case of AES, if an attacker were to blank the S-box with zeroes 
on the victims machine, then due to the XORing of the data with an entry from the key 
schedule, the key would be directly outputted in the cipher text.  Kerins and Kursawe 
offer methods to defend against S-box blanking, such as physical protection of the cipher 
binary by the operating system, code obfuscation or executable packers, dynamic static 
S-box generation at run time, and dynamically modifying a generated S-box.  These 
suggestions are useful, as the dynamic modified generated S-box offers protections 
against both S-box blanking as well as the weak 9-term arithmetic complexity of the 
standard AES S-box as mentioned in [20] [21]. 
1.3. Cellular Automata Properties for Cryptography 
There are many properties of Cellular Automata that may help or hinder their 
usefulness in cryptographic applications.  For example, any cellular automata that is not 
injective is said to be a non-reversible CA [2].  Such a non-reversible CA loses data each 
generation, which lowers its usefulness for encryption purposes.  It may be possible to 
find a use for these automata where reversibility is not important, such as random number 
generation and hashing functions.  Yet in the case of reversible cellular automata (RCA), 
it is easy to see one simple use in cryptography.  An RCA could be used as a diffusion 
step.  Each cell would represent a bit from a file, and the global transition functions F and 
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F-1 would be used for performing diffusion of bits within a block of data.  However, 
running a RCA on a block of data for an arbitrary number of generations does not make a 
cryptographically secure algorithm.  The use of an RCA as the 'diffusion' step in a 
substitution permutation cipher (SPN) seems obvious, but a single static RCA rule does 
not offer much more diffusion than the typical RowShift and ColumnMix operations.  
Even with the existence of techniques for creating RCA (tiling techniques, and second 
order CA) [23] the information preserving property of RCA may be of more interest for 
some cryptographic applications than reversibility.  A final property – and one of the 
most critical for cryptographic purposes – is the affine property.  If a Cellular Automata 
Cryptosystem (CAC) depends heavily on weak affine transformations, the low linear 
complexity of the transformations will most likely lead to an insecure algorithm when 
used as a diffusion step [24]. 
 
1.3.1. Previous Research in Combining CA and Cryptography. 
As mentioned previously, there have been many attempts at creating a CAC.  In 
[16] S. Nandi, et al, propose a class of block and stream ciphers based on what they call 
"fundamental transformations".  The scheme offered creates an alternating group of 
permutations using EXNOR logic, various programmable one dimensional cellular 
automata (PCA) rules (51, 153, and 195), and a rule selection function based on a given 
key.  One-dimensional automata rules were defined by Stephen Wolfram [25], as shown 
 
Figure 12.  Defining rules for 1-Dimensional automata. 
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in Figure 12.  The three top cells indicate the current configuration of the central cell and 
its two neighbors.  The single cell in the second row indicates what color the central cell 
will have in the next generation.  The binary pattern of the next generation defines the 
rule number from 0 to 255.  For example, in Figure 12, the top example has a next 
generation pattern of 00000000, or rule 0, while the bottom example has the pattern 
00110011, or rule 51.  A rebuttal to their proposal is offered in [26], where Blackburn 
and Murphy rigorously analyze the scheme and conclude that all the transformations are 
of the affine group and are therefore cryptographically weak.  They state that they can 
determine the initial state of the automata (in this case, the key) by solving a set of linear 
equations with L – 2 variables and with only 2L+2 trials, where the initial key is an LxL 
bit matrix and the proposed value of L by Nandi is 16.   
Nandi, et al, also claim the ability to use PCA as "high quality pseudorandom 
pattern generators" as well as for dynamic key generation and manipulation for stream 
ciphers.  Their proposed use of CA as pseudo random pattern generators was not 
questioned and is supported by the finding in S. Wolfram's research [18]; yet [24] argues 
that the Komogorov complexity theory proves that the simple local rules of cellular 
automata cannot create true randomness and thus may not be good enough for 
cryptographic applications.  Nandi, et al, question the absolute terms of insecurity based 
on their affine transformations, inquire about ways to absolutely secure such a system, 
and re-iterate their correct statements about CA natural fit with VLSI design in [27]. 
In his paper "Cryptosystems Based on Reversible Cellular Automata", Jarrko Kari 
offers another CA based cryptosystem which offers some useful suggestions to any future 
attempts.  He proposes both a secret-key and a public-key cryptosystem using cellular 
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automata.  The proposed symmetric key system uses a CA to modify the key each block.  
Kari suggests that each application of the CA to the key offers increased security.  As 
with most systems, special precautions must be taken to avoid weak keys.  A simple 
solution to the problem of homogenous input key or plaintext is offered.  Kari suggests 
always forcing some of the cells to certain states and using input data to populate the 
other cells.  This suggestion and parameterization of the k value offer an avalanche effect 
that results in largely different output if a single bit of the key or plain text is changed.   
Kari also offers an asymmetric or public key CAC.  The general theory of 
public-key encryption using CA is to craft a complimentary pair of automata that are hard 
to find the inverses of individually.  Finding the inverse of a given automata, is an 
NP-Hard problem according to Toffoli and Margolus in [23].  However, going against 
traditional methodology, Kari suggests the use of many simple self-inverting "marker 
automata", or transformations, which will decrypt when run in reverse.  This sounds more 
like a single key system, as the key is simply the order in which to run the data through 
the "automata" (forward or backward).  Calling these simple and linear transformation 
rules an automata, let alone a crypto system, is misleading. 
In [1], the authors propose a private key block cipher system that moves away 
from simply using a 1-dimensional CA to generate the key stream and XOR logic as 
previous research in [17] and [16] did.  The algorithm's key consists of the number of 
RCA, the iterations p, and p input vectors.  The two transition matrices generated based 
on this data are inverses of each other and have possible uses in encryption.  However, 
the transition matrices generated are assumed (by the author) to be linear, which may 
prove to be a weakness.  The authors suggest that their algorithm is more resistant to 
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exhaustive search attack than other CACs due to its larger key space lower bound of 22p.  
As most other offered solutions, their real focus is on fast parallel operation for hardware 
VLSI designs.  As such, their boundary neighbors are always considered with a null state 
as previously suggested. 
Efforts to use CA for cryptography seek to take advantage of the fact that simple 
rules can generate complex pseudorandom patterns and that they can be implemented in 
hardware for very fast and efficient operation.  While there have been many attempts in 
using CA for cryptography, not many have been proven to be cryptographically secure.  
On the contrary, any cryptosystem based on affine, linear, simple, or "fundamental 
transformations" is cryptographically weak and only a problem of solving a system of 
equations with the support of trial data.  Using one-dimensional pseudorandom patterns 
generated by CA for a key stream is argued to be insufficient for cryptography [24].  The 
use of non-homogenous cellular automata for public-key systems also suffers from the 
challenge of generating complimentary pairs of automata and the fact [24] that 
NP-hardness does not necessarily guarantee security for cryptosystems. 
1.3.2. Other Possible Uses of CA in Cryptography. 
Researchers have made many attempts at creating cryptosystems based nearly 
entirely on cellular automata.  Some of the problems in these CACs lead researchers to 
question the true applicability of CA for any cryptographic use.  While the idea of using 
CA as a cryptographic primitive, like a key expansion algorithm, or as the confusion and 
diffusion steps themselves may seem like a lost cause, CA may still have some possible 
application.  For example, in [28] the author proposes the use of CA to generate new and 
unique S-boxes for block ciphers.  While it remains to be shown that CA can generate 
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good non-linearity in an S-box, S-boxes are a proven and very powerful cryptographic 
primitive.  In this sense, while developing entirely new algorithms based on cellular 
automata might be questionable based on prior attempts, CA surely have some use in 
further enhancing existing and proven cryptographic primitives like an S-box.  While 
S-boxes are typically generated deterministically, or even hard-coded into the binary, 
there is an opportunity for increased security in dynamic S-boxes that are kept secret 
from the attacker. 
Thus, based on the conclusions of [20] [21] [22] and suggestions of [28], the S-box 
cryptographic primitive, and specifically the AES/Rijndael implementation, could 
possibly be improved in the following ways: 
 
1. Dynamically generate S-boxes at runtime, do not store a single static S-box in the 
binary.  Dynamic generation protects against S-box blanking. 
2. The 9-term algebraic expression for the S-box could be removed with some 
dynamic modifications of the S-box. 
3. Having more than one initial S-box based on user choice or key, as opposed to 





2.  CRYPTOSYSTEM DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
 
Initially there were several ideas that could have been used to develop this cellular 
automata cryptosystem.  The base encryption algorithm chosen for the cryptosystem is 
Rijndael with some restrictions placed on its parameters.  The chosen parameters 
guarantee a very high level of security and allow for a simpler implementation.  The 
choice of CA for S-box mixing was based on the simple Margolus neighborhood.  
Margolus, which was the first cellular automata investigated for this purpose, ended up 
being a very suitable method due to the simplicity and elegance of its alternating 
partitioning scheme.  The following section provides details on the design and 
implementation of the proposed CAC. 
This thesis proposes a CAC based on Rijndael symmetric block cipher that 
implements: 
1. Dynamic S-box generation, generating up to 128 unique and valid initial 
S-boxes. 
2. A Cellular Automata that dynamically, reversibly, and uniformly 
redistributes S-box and Inverse S-box values. 
3. The option of modifying the S-box before key expansion for generating 
different expansions based on the input parameters. 
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4. User parameters controlling the Initial S-box choice and the number of 
generations the Automata should modify the S-box per block, as well as a 
threshold parameter of the CA. 
5. 256-bit block size, 256-bit key size, CBC mode with IV generated from 
clock drift calculations, double padding. 
6. Optional key shuffling CA is also provided. 
7. All user input parameters must be known to properly decrypt a file. 
 
There are many steps in developing and testing a CAC.  In this system, there are 
two main parts: the encryption system and the S-box modifying CA.  Each part has 
multiple steps; thus a modular unit-tested design was used throughout.  Each function 
was rigorously tested during the implementation to ensure the proper operation and to 
avoid debugging nightmares where encryption and decryption just do not work properly. 
 
 
Figure 13.  Rjindael Encryption Flowchart for processing a single block. doRounds 
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2.1.  Rijndael Implementation. 
Implementing Rijndael with specific parameters of 256-bit key and 256-bit blocks 
was the first step towards realizing the design of the eventual CAC.  A systematic 
approach was taken, with each function being tested and verified before moving to the 
next (Figure 13).  The Galois mathematics functions were based on and verified with the 
example C++ code, tutorials, and lookup tables released into the public domain on Sam 
Trenholme's website [19].  Specifically, the public domain Rijndael code utilized in the 
CAC deals with generating multiple supporting tables.  This code was utilized because it 
is highly optimized for performing various Galois Field mathematics in GF(28), and to re-
write these base functions into less optimized and less tested versions would be 
counterproductive. 
Specifically, the public domain functions that were implemented generate the log 
table, exponentiation table, division table, and the key expansion table.  These 
initialization functions generate 8-bit 256 entry tables for performing GF(28) math 
quickly.  These functions were modified at various times during their integration into a 
working Rijndael implementation.  Most of these changes were data type and data 
structure changes, for example making all data types unsigned 8-bit (for the 8-bit field) 
and making all two dimensional tables one dimensional.  Another function that utilizes 
public domain C++ code is the mixColumn operation.  Once again, the existence of high 
quality public domain source code for this crucial step in implementing the Rijndael half 
of the CAC makes re-implementation pointless.  The public domain functions were 
mainly used for convenience in the early stages of development, and on their own they do 
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nothing.  They serve as initialization and mathematics routines only.  Charts showing 
functions source and their use in the process can be found in Appendix A5 and A6. 
2.1.1. Generating Rijndael's Galois Field. 
The first step of the Rijndael implementation design dealt with generating the 
Galois Field used throughout the AES/Rijndael algorithm.  A Galois Field is typically 
described with the notation GF(pn) where p is the characteristic prime number, and the 
value (pn) represents the order (total elements) of the field.  In the case of AES\Rijndael, 
the field used has order 256 and characteristic prime of n=2, thus a GF(28).  Doing 
mathematics in a Galois field requires that all results fit within the field, i.e. 8-bits.  
Adding and subtracting in Rijndael's Galois field are represented by an XOR operation.  
In contrast, multiplication, division, exponentiation, and logarithms require operations 
that are more complex.  Luckily, these operations can be handled with lookup tables.  In 
the implementation, five tables are generated based on a user chosen Galois generator.  
These generators are numbers that , traverse all possible values in the Galois field (except 
zero) when exponentiated 255 times.  There are 128 Galois generators in GF(28).  The 
chosen Galois generator affects all five look-up tables in the implementation, the S-box, 
and the later key-expansion.  Making it a user parameter increases key-space and hides 
the initial S-box of the CAC from the attacker, as opposed to AES's single S-box.  
2.1.1.1.  Multiplying in GF(28). 
As mentioned, multiplication in GF(28) is more complicated than the simple XOR 
that is used for addition and subtraction.  The abundant Galois field theory and 
supporting information in the AES proposal for Rijndael [9] can be implemented with a 
surprisingly simple algorithm, shown in Figure 14:   
 33 
 
2.1.1.2. Generating the Exponentiation and Log Tables. 
The generator is first used to build the exponentiation table and the log table as 
per the following algorithm shown in Figure 15: 
 
The exponentiation table and the log table can be used to multiply two numbers in 
the Galois field much more quickly than the standard Galois multiply (which was used to 
generate the tables).  This is done with the method shown in Figure 16: 
 
 
set a = logTable[X] 
set b = logTable[Y] 
set sum = a + b mod 255  (normal addition, not galois) 
set product = expTable[sum] 
 
Figure 16  Multiplication of X and Y in the GF using tables. 
set expTable[0] = 1 
set expTable[255] = 1 
for x = 1 to 255 do 
  set expTable[x] = expTable[x-1] * galoisGenerator (galois multiplication) 
  set logTable[expTable[x]] = x 
set expTable[255] = 1 
 
Figure 15  Generating the Exponetiation and Log Tables 
 
set product = 0 
set highbit = 0 
for x = 0 to 7 
   if(operandB AND '01') 
      product = product ⊕ operandB 
   highbit = (operandA AND '80') 
   bitShiftLeft(operandA, 1) 
   if(highbit) 
      operandA = operandA ⊕ '1b' 
   bitShiftRight(operandB,1) 
return product 
 
Fig. 14  Multiplying in Rijndael's Galois Field 
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2.1.1.3.  Generating the Multiplicative Inverse Table. 
Division in Rijndael's Galois Field is performed by taking the logarithm of the 
numerator and subtracting the logarithm of the denominator modulo 255 and looking it 
up in the exponentiation table.  The only division operations actually performed in 
Rijndael always have one as the numerator; thus, we generate the multiplicative inverse 
table as shown in Figure 17.  The log of 1 (the numerator) always has a value of 255.  
The log of the denominator is subtracted from 255, and the result is looked up in the 
exponentiation table.  These tricks for quickly performing mathematics in the Galois 
Field were found on Sam Trenholme's website, and replaces the typical generalized 
Galois Field polynomial based calculations for table look ups.  These tables will be used 
to build the initial S-box and inverse S-box. 
 
2.1.1.4. Generating the S-box and Inverse S-box. 
The S-box, handles Shannon's confusion step of the SPN cipher Rijndael.  It 
simply handles all byte substitutions and thus requires an inverse table.  It is generated by 
taking the multiplicative inverse of a given number and transforming it with a simple 
affine transformation matrix.  A single value for the S-box can be transformed and 
calculated with the algorithm shown in Figure 18: 
set mulInv[0] = 0 
for x = 1 to 255 
  mulInv[x] = expTable[255 – logTable[x]] 
 
Figure 17  Generating the Multiplicative Inverse 
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 Using the SUB algorithm (Figure 18) the S-box and Inverse S-box tables were 
generated, as shown in Figure 19: 
 
2.1.2.  Performing the MixColumn Operation. 
The MixColumn operation performs half of Shannon's diffusion step in Rijndael, 
with ShiftRow performing the other half.  It accomplishes this diffusion of bits by using 
matrix multiplication within the Galois field.  Figure 5b, showed a graphical 
representation of this function.  The MixColumn operation is performed on every column 
of the state.  The state represents the current block of data being operated on.  In this 
case, the 256-bit block size being implemented has a state of 4x8 bytes.  Each of the eight 
4x1 column matrices are multiplied by one of the two 4x4 matrices shown in Figure 20, 
depending on whether encryption or decryption is being performed.  Multiplying by these 
matrices ensures that all four entries in the column will mix with each other and 
reversibly so.  The creators of Rijndael chose these matrices based on the fact that within 
the Galois field the columns are considered polynomials over GF(28), which are 
multiplied modulo the irreducible polynomial x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1 [9].  This constant 
for x = 0 to 255 
   Sbox[x] = SUB(x) 
   SboxInv[Sbox[x]] = x 
 
Figure 19. Generating the S-box and Inverse S-box Tables 
 
set s = mulInv[inputByte] 
set x = mulInv[inputByte] 
for c = 0 to 3 
   s = ROTL(s,1)  (circular rotate s left by one) 
   x = x ⊕ s           ( ⊕ = XOR) 
outputByte = x ⊕ galoisGenerator 
 
Figure 18  Getting an S-box Entry (SUB) 
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polynomial is co-prime to x4 + 1 and thus invertible as per standard Galois Field 
methodology [9], which this thesis largely ignores with its optimized table based 
approach to Galois Field mathematics.    
 
Multiplication and addition during the matrix operations are performed within the 
GF(28), with addition and subtraction being the XOR operation [9].  These kinds of 
operations quickly lead toward meeting the Critical Avalanche Criterion [29] which 
requires that any bit change in the input affects an average of 50% of the bits in the 
output.  The MixColumn operation moves a fair number of bits to different positions, as 
can be seen in Figure 21.  Figure 22 shows the original pattern representing the four rows 
of data shown in Figure 21, and the bit pattern after performing the MixColumn 
operation. 
 
Fig. 21  MixColumn Effects in Hexadecimal on an input block. 
14  9 13 11 
11 14  9 13 
13 11 14  9 
 9 13 11 14 
Rjindael's Inv 4x4 Matrix 
2  3  1  1 
1  2  3  1 
1  1  2  3 
3  1  1  2 
Fig 20.  Rjindael's 4x4 Matrix 
00 08 10 18 20 28 30 38 
40 48 50 58 60 68 70 78 
80 88 90 98 a0 a8 b0 b8 
c0 c8 d0 d8 e0 e8 f0 f8 
80 88 90 98 a0 a8 b0 b8 
db d3 cb c3 fb f3 eb e3 
00 08 10 18 20 28 30 38 
5b 53 4b 43 7b 73 6b 63 
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2.1.3.  Performing the ShiftRow Operation. 
The ShiftRow operation performs the second half of the diffusion of bits 
throughout the state.   The prime operation of ShiftRow is a one-byte circular shift of the 
row: left or right for encryption or decryption respectively.  The number of times each 
row is shifted depends on the block size and the row number itself.  For the fixed 256-bit 
block size being implemented, the 8-byte rows 3, 2, and 1, are shifted 4, 3, and 1, times 
respectively.  Figure 5b, showed a simple graphical example of this process.  Row 0 is 
never shifted with any block size.  These operations result in yet more diffusion, as 
shown in Figure 23 and Figure 24.  You will notice that the first row remains unchanged, 
the second row was shifted once, and the third and fourth rows are shifted 3 and 4 times 
respectively.  Figure 24 shows the data from Figure 23 represented as bits, with an 




Fig. 23  ShiftRow Effects in Hexadecimal on an input block 
00 08 10 18 20 28 30 38 
40 48 50 58 60 68 70 78 
80 88 90 98 a0 a8 b0 b8 
c0 c8 d0 d8 e0 e8 f0 f8 
 
00 08 10 18 20 28 30 38 
48 50 58 60 68 70 78 40 
90 98 a0 a8 b0 b8 80 88 






Fig 22.  Mix column effect on the bits of the state shown in Figure 21. 
1) Original Bit Pattern, 2) Resulting MixColumn Bit Pattern 
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2.1.4.  Performing Key Expansion. 
Key expansion is the process of taking the user's small and possibly weak input 
key and procedurally expanding it into a much larger and stronger key.  The key 
expansion functions for Rijndael differ slightly based on the size of the input key.  For a 
256-bit key, the algorithm generates an additional 448 bytes for the key schedule.  In this 
implementation, forcing a fixed sized 256-bit key slightly simplifies the process of 
generating the key schedule.  However, the process still requires several functions.  These 
functions consist of an 8-bit circular rotate on a 32-bit word, the RCON operation 
(exponentiation of 2), a substitution using the S-box, and finally the key schedule 
function.  While the first two functions may be trivial (Figure 25, 26), they are illustrated 
in pseudo-code along with the others for completeness. 
 
set a = in[0] 
for c = 0 to 3 
    in[c] = in[c+1] 
in[3] = a 
 






Fig 24.  ShiftRow effects on the state shown in Figure 23. 




The ScheduleCore function (Figure 27) does most of the work during key 
expansion.  It takes four input bytes (32-bits) of the key and uses the rotate and RCON 
operations to do some mixing of the key.  This mixing is necessary to avoid weak keys 




The final algorithm (Figure 28) in key expansion uses ScheduleCore to do most of 
its work.  However, in the case of 256-bit keys, this algorithm also does some extra 
mixing by adding an extra S-box substitution.  This extra step is necessary to maintain 
strength in larger input keys that is not required for small keys.  For the 256-bit key 
expansion, the ScheduleCore algorithm expects the first 32-bytes of the 480-byte 
InputKey array to contain the user supplied key.  This expectation allows in place 
expansion to the final 480-byte key. 
 
rotate(FourInputBytes) 
for c = 0 to 3 
   FourInputBytes[c] = Sbox[FourInputBytes[c]] 
FourInputBytes[0] = FourInputBytes[0] ⊕ rcon(inputExponent) 
 
Fig. 27  ScheduleCore scrambles four bytes and uses rcon on the first byte. 
set result = 1 
if(inputExponent == 0) return 0 
while(inputExponent != 1) 
    result = gmul(result, 2) 
    inputExponent = inputExponent – 1 
return result 
 




2.1.5.  AddRoundKey Function. 
With the key expansion complete, most of the core functions of Rijndael have been 
implemented.  The only core function that remains to be implemented deals with actually 
utilizing the key to further confuse the input data and thus tie the cipher text to the user's 
secret key.  This function performs a simple XOR operation (addition) between the 
intermediate state (block of data) being operated on and a part of the expanded key.  The 
key added with AddRoundKey (Figure 29) is dependent on the current round of 
encryption that is being performed.  With the 256-bit key expansion performed in this 
implementation, 14 rounds of encryption are performed on each block, with each round 
adding a different 32-byte round key from the expanded key. 
 
 
set keyOffset = inputRound * 32 
for i = 0 to 31 
   state[i] = state[i] ⊕ inputKey[keyOffset] 
   keyOffset = keyOffset + 1 
 
Fig. 29  AddRoundKey modifies the state by XORing with a round key. 
array FourTempBytes[4] 
set keyOffset = 32 
set inputExponent = 1 
while(keyOffset < 480) 
   for a = 0 to 3 
       FourTempBytes[a] = inputKey[a + c – 4] 
   if( c mod 32 == 0) 
       ScheduleCore(FourTempBytes, inputExponent) 
       inputExponent = inputExponent + 1 
   if( c mod 32 == 16) 
       for a = 0 to 3 
           FourTempBytes[a] = Sbox[FourTempBytes[a]] 
   for a = 0 to 3 
       inputKey[c] = inputKey[c – 32] ⊕ FourTempBytes[a] 
       c = c + 1 
 
Fig. 28  The KeyExpansion algorithm performs in place expansion of the key. 
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2.1.6.  Other Rijndael Implementation Details. 
With the core Rijndael functions finished, only a few more functions were 
required to have a working Rijndael implementation.  The functions outlined here deal 
with background processes like, CBC mode, padding, as well as the basic doRounds and 
doInvRounds functions that use all core functions to perform the encryption. 
2.1.6.1. Implementing doRounds and doInvRounds Functions. 
The doRounds function (and inverse function) performs all the confusion and 
diffusion functions previously explained.  The order in which these core functions are 
called by doRounds were carefully chosen by Rijndael's authors to maintain high security 
and secrecy.  For decryption, the inverse of each core function is used in an opposite 
calling order.  The doRounds function is exactly as shown in Figure 30, and directly 
operates on the current block of data (state).  The doInvRounds function performs actions 
in the opposite order, with the opposite key order, and calls inverse functions to undo the 




for i = 0 to Rounds – 1 (14 rounds for 256-bit blocks) 
    SubstituteBytes() 
    ShiftRows() 
    MixColumns() 









2.1.6.2. Implementing CBC Mode. 
CBC mode, outlined by Figure 9, requires the generation of an initialization 
vector (IV).  As mentioned previously, the IV does not need to be kept secret from the 
attacker.  In fact, it cannot be kept secret from the attacker as it is required to decrypt the 
file properly.  For this reason, the IV is typically stored as the first block in the cipher 
text.  As a rule, the final IV must be random and never re-used with the same key.  This 
unique IV can be achieved from non-uniform random input data by encrypting the IV 
with the user's key.  For platform independence, the implementation uses clock drift 
calculations to generate the IV as shown in Figure 32: 
 
Though the entropy of the clock drift IV calculation is dependent on the current 
system usage, its output is typically not uniform random (Figure 33).  After encryption 
with the user's key, the output (as per typical Rijndael encryption) is uniform random and 
addRoundKey(14) 
invShiftRows() 
for i = Rounds – 1 downto 1 
    invSubstituteBytes() 
    addRoundKey(i) 
    invMixColumns() 




Fig. 31  doInvRounds performs Rijndael decryption on the current block of data. 
 
array IV[32] 
set clockTime = 0  
for i = 0 to 31 
    IV[i] = 0 
    clockTime = clock() 
    while(clockTime == clock()) 
         IV[i] = IV[i] + 1 
 
Fig. 32  Utilizing clock drift for cross platform CBC IV generation. 
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appropriate for use as an IV.  For extra mixing, a CBC style XOR is also performed 





With the IV generated, the basic functionality of CBC mode only requires two 
trivial functions: one to update the current CBC state (a memcopy) and one to XOR each 
entry of the CBC state with the encryption state.  These simple functions were even used 




ClockDriftFill(IV)   //Fill IV with clock drift values 
doRounds(IV)         //Do Encryption rounds on the IV 
copy(IV, temp)        //Copy the IV array to the Temp array 
ClockDriftFill(IV)  //Fill IV with clock drift values 
XOR(IV, temp)      //XOR all 32 IV entries with the Temp entries 
doRounds(IV)        //Do Encryption rounds on the IV 
 
return IV                //IV is ready. 
 
Fig. 34  InitIV function utilizes clock drift, encryption, and CBC to create IV. 














Fig 33.  Frequency of Bytes in clock drift output. 
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2.1.6.3. Implementing the Padding Functions. 
The basics of the padding functions are trivial in nature but quite tedious in 
implementation.  The general idea employed here is detailed in Figure 11.  The idea is to 
pad the last block of data with a value equal to the number of padding bytes plus the size 
of a complete block.  In addition, a complete block of padding is always encrypted as the 
final block; this method avoids the problem of removing padding bytes mentioned earlier.  
After padding and encrypting the final block, a second complete block of padding (with 
the same value) is encrypted and outputted.  For decryption, the second to last block is 
decrypted, and then the last block's decrypted data is used to remove padding.  Testing 
and perfecting the padding functions required a lot of trial and error, which seems typical 
regardless of the simplicity of the method. 
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2.2.  Implementing Margolus Automata 
The original inspiration to use a Margolus style automata came from the 
undeniable reversibility of the standard billiard ball model (BBM) (Figure 35b) [6].  The 
BBM is a two state Margolus automata that simulates particle interactions as if they were 
bouncing balls.  The BBM is interesting because its simple rules are reversible and can be 
run forward or backward in time.  It was thought that if the BBM were tied to an S-box or 
bits of data as a diffusion step, it would be possible to use the BBM modify and restore 
the data.  Reversibility of this kind is due to symmetry between transition rules and 
symmetrical states.  With such a symmetrical Margolus neighborhood automata, 
reversing the calculation of generations only requires an inversion of the current 
 
A                    B                      C 
Figure 35. a. Possible Configurations 
                  b. Billiard Ball Transition Rules 
                  c. Bounce Gas Transition Rules 
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EvenOdd variable state.  Though it seems nice, this type of reversibility turned out to be 
unnecessary for S-boxes because the S-box, automata generation, and current block of 
data are all dependent.  This means that the block being processed and the S-box must be 
synchronized between encryption and decryption, not the reversed order.    
 
After taking a closer look at the mixing performance of the BBM, it was observed 
that some configurations remained static for each generation, namely 2x2 blocks of living 
cells (Figure 36) and any cluster of living cells.  Having many configurations with null 
transition rules would limit the amount of scrambling performed; thus it was decided that 
automata rules that mix more uniformly would be preferable for this application.   
 
 
1                                            2                                            3 
Figure. 37  Weak Margolus rule showing clustering across generations. 
 
Figure 36  Billiard ball model interactions. 
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Finding rules with certain properties can be difficult in some automata systems.  
This difficulty increases with the size of the neighborhood and number of possible states.  
In this system, there was the option of allowing the users to generate their own rules key.  
However, based on visual results of random rules, some patterns emerge that severely 
weaken the S-box's uniformity (Fig 37.). The rule chosen for the final design was the 
Bounce Gas rule invented by Tim Tyler [7] (Figure 35c).  This rule is described by the 
author as a uniform gas rule, and based on experimental results, it does distribute 'on' and 
'off' cells, or particles, uniformly (Figure 38).  Due to symmetries in its transition rules 
(Figure 39), it also is reversible and thus applicable as a uniform bit-diffusion step in a 
different CAC design. 
 
 
Fig. 38.  Visualization of uniform distribution of on and off cells 
under the uniform bounce gas rule in 100 generation steps. 
    
            1                       2 
    
            3                       4 
    
            5                       6 
Non-symmetrical initial pattern 
single cell added causes eventual 
uniform diffusion of cells. 
   
            1                       2 
   
            3                       4 
   
            5                       6 
Symmetrical starting pattern 
diffusion retains symmetry 
seen in rules. 
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The main advantage of the Margolus neighborhood for S-box modification is the 
simple 2x2-block design.  This partitioning scheme allowed all rules to be simple swaps 
between horizontal, vertical, or diagonal pairs of cells.  For each of the 16 configurations 
possible with 2x2 blocks, any number of the six swaps may be performed.  
  
Though the implementation only uses the BounceGas rule, having a swapping 
design allows all possible rules, weak or not, to be used for S-box modification, as losing 
data is impossible.  Of course, due to this feature, some transitions possible in a normal 
Margolus implementations are impossible, a transition from state zero to fifteen for 
example.  There was also the inverse S-box to swap, but maintaining invertibility 
between the S-box and Inverse S-box was a trivial operation.  The order in which the 
swaps are processed is fixed and may affect the results.   
 
Figure 39  Symmetry in BounceGas Rules allowing full reversibility, uniform 
dispersion, and symmetrical pattern propagation. 
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Another useful feature of the design is the threshold value.  This value is used to 
determine which cells are considered live and which are considered dead, state 1 and 0 
respectively.  The default value is '127' for uniformity purposes.  With this setting, half 
the cells in the S-box will be live and half will be dead.  Figure 40 shows how a typical 
S-Box looks when this threshold value is applied.  Slight modification of the threshold 
value drastically alters the results, hence its use as a user parameter.  As the threshold 
varies further from the half-way value of 127, fewer swaps will be performed.  When the 
threshold value reaches a value of 0 or 255, no swaps will be performed.  No swaps are 
performed when a partition is in configuration 0 or F, as per the BounceGas rules shown 
in Figure 35c.  Thus, the threshold values are limited to a range to ensure the ratio of live 
to dead cells is not too skewed, which would hinder diffusion.   
2.2.1.  Determining the Rule Structure. 
The 16*6 possible swapping rules available for defining the transition function 
were designed as a 16x6 array of Booleans.  For each of the 16 configurations, or states 
 
Figure 40.  S-Box viewed as a CA grid with threshold 0x7f, 
 1:1 alive to dead ratio. 
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as it is used here, there are six Boolean values indicating whether to perform that swap.  
This method can easily perform the swaps on the cell with the algorithm shown in   
Figure 41:   
 
2.2.2.  Determining the Configuration. 
Determining the configuration of a 4x4 block is performed very often and 
therefore needs to be fast.  The way the states are numbered in Figure 35a follows a 
binary pattern.  This numbering scheme coupled with the rule matrix implemented, 
allows the current configuration value to be calculated very efficiently.  In the 
implementation it is calculated with a single line define statement, encompassing the 
general formula shown in Figure 42 which sums up the decimal value of the four 'bits' in 





set currentState = 0 
currentState = currentState + getCellValue(x+1,y+1) > threshHold ? 8 : 0 
currentState = currentState + getCellValue(x,y+1) > threshHold ? 4 : 0 
currentState = currentState + getCellValue(x+1,y) > threshHold ? 2 : 0 
currentState = currentState + getCellValue(x,y) > threshHold ? 1 : 0 
 
Figure 42.  GetConfiguration function, where "?:" represents the C/C++ tertiary 
operator and threshHold is an 8-bit value with default 127. 
for swapType = 0 to 5 
   if(rulesMatrix[currentState][swapType] == true) 
   switch(swapType) 
      case 0 
         swapDiag1 
      case 1 
         swapDiag2 
      … 
      case 5 
         swapVert2 
Figure 41.  DoTransition function based on 'currentState' 
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2.2.3.  Making Margolus Move. 
With the simple algorithms for applying the swaps and for determining the current 
configuration, there comes an equally simple method for making it all work.  As shown 
previously in Figure 2c., the alternating even and odd partitioning scheme inherent in the 
Margolus neighborhood creates an environment where living cells, or particles, are 
constantly moving.  The partitioning scheme can easily be handled by processing the map 
starting from position (0,0) or position (1,1), based on the even or odd state.  Border 
handling is another concern for partitioning, and naturally wrapping the borders into a 
torus was preferred for this software implementation.  The complete procedure for 
processing a generation of an XxY map is quite simple as Margolus intended (Figure 43).  
The S-box is simply an array; thus, the CA was easily programmed to work within 
one-dimensional arrays by using the basic formula: offset = x + y*width. 
 
2.3.  CAC Construction. 
Combining the cellular automata to the crypto system was painless with this 
solution.  Once the automata is initialized, its operation only requires per block calls to 
perform generations on the S-boxes.  The addition of the CA to the encryption process 
yields the flowchart in Figure 44, and Appendix A6 provides a more detailed flowchart.  
Figure 44, displays the process of encrypting an entire file, where CBC, padding, and CA 
evenOdd = !evenOdd 
for x = evenOdd to X-1 
   for y = evenOdd to Y-1 
       doTransition(x, y, getConfiguration(x, y)) 
       y = y + 2 
    x = x + 2 
 
Figure. 43 Processing the map where doTransition and 
getConfiguration are defined by Figures 41 and 42 respectively. 
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generations are all performed.  At this point, due to it being a trivial modification of the 
CA source class, a key modification automata with the same rules was also added.  This 
addition alone has the potential of increasing security on many ciphers. 
 
 
Figure 44.  Flow chart showing the process of encrypting a 




3.  ANALYSIS OF CRYPTOSYSTEM 
 
During the implementation of the CAC, the modular systematic approach was 
used to verify the proper operation of each algorithm.  With the implementation complete 
and working, analysis of the results needs to be performed.  The hypothesis of this 
analysis is that the CAC designed will offer improvements to the S-box cryptographic 
primitive with a minimal performance impact.  The analysis of security focuses on the 
differences between Rijndael and the CAC.  The security of the specific binary 
implementation of the CAC is not a major focus, as minor coding mistakes and insecure 
user input methods do not reflect on the security of the actual design. 
3.1.  Analyzing the Cellular Automata. 
The Margolus automata was analyzed in a number of ways to ensure it meets the 
criteria for which it was chosen.  Tim Tyler, the author of the BounceGas rule [7], claims 
that the rule simulates a "uniform gas".  This claim, if true, benefits the CAC by ensuring 
no bias or clustering of values in the S-box.  If the initial S-box is sufficiently random, 
then a uniform gas rule strongly suggests the creation of equally random S-boxes.  To 
verify this uniformity claim, specifically for the 2-state automata, a number of tests were 
designed and performed. 
3.1.1.  Distribution of States. 
In the most basic sense, all Margolus automata rules result in 1-bit bitmaps.  The 
S-box also must be viewed like this, which is why the threshold value is required.  
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Looking at the S-box as a 1-bit bitmap, it was thought that if the BounceGas rule is in 
fact uniform, then the average mid-point for the ones and the zeros should be roughly 
equal and near the center of the map at all times.  A simple experiment was performed to 
test this idea.  The experiment required starting with a non-uniform map with roughly 
one-half all 'ones' and the other half all 'zeros'.  With the BounceGas rules, a symmetrical 
starting state will always remain symmetrical; thus, a few random cells on either side 
were inverted from the start.  After the map was initialized, single generations were 
performed (Figure 45).  Based on the visualization of the data, it is obvious that the 
non-uniform starting state quickly becomes uniformly mixed and remains that way. 
 
After each generation the automata modified S-box, was analyzed to find the 
average location of the two states.  This means, for each S-box entry, the threshold was 
applied to determine if the entry is considered true or false (on or off, alive or dead, etc).  
Based on this state, the coordinates for that entry are added to one or the other running 
average.  These averages represent the overall location of the two possible states.  If the 
 
Figure. 45  Distribution of average Mid-Points for both states, 
from a non-uniform initial state in a 16x16 bitmap.  5782 trials. 
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two states are equally spread among the map, then they will both have values near the 
center of the map (7,7).  This would also suggest that from a non-uniform starting state 
the distance of the midpoints from the center of the map (7,7) for both 'true' and 'false' 
states would approach zero, after some number of generations (Figure 46).  Due to the 
non-uniform starting states, the distance from center begins large but decreases each 
generation for both data sets.  The data also shows bias towards one set over the other 
because the number of true states is not equal to the number of false states.  When the 
same tests are performed on a uniform initial S-box, like those generated in the 
implementation, the S-boxes bitmaps remain uniform.   
 
3.1.2.  Distribution of Swap Counts. 
The operation of the Margolus automata was investigated in terms of the number of 
swaps performed per generation.  It was expected that the data would be normally 
distributed.  Any results other than normal would not fit the operation of a uniform and 
chaotic system.  Figure 47 indicates that the distribution is normal with a large variance 
 
Figure. 46  Midpoint distance from center location, from a non-uniform 
initial state.  140 of 5143 trials shown. 
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and an average of 48 swaps per generation under the BounceGas rules.  Theoretically, it 
may be possible for an attacker to determine the user's initial S-box based on the 
deterministic swap counts, though the availability of 128 threshold values and 128 initial 




3.2.  Analyzing the Generated S-boxes. 
S-boxes, a major part of the confusion step of the cipher, require some properties 
to avoid leaking information into the cipher text.  The S-boxes initially generated with the 
Galois generators are said – with some arguments [20] [21] – to be strong in some 
properties like the strict avalanche criterion and non-linearity [9].  Based on the previous 
analysis of the CA uniform dispersion properties, and thus randomness in byte values, it 
was expected that the generated S-boxes would also perform well in the same tests.  One 
direct result of using a new S-box every block is the effect it has on the data histogram of 
a file.  If a large file of English text were simply substituted with the static S-box values, 
 
Figure 47.  BounceGas rules swap count per generation with threshold at 127. 
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frequency analysis could easily be used to decrypt the cipher text.  However, if the same 
file data were substituted with different values for each 32-byte block, this attack would 
be difficult due to the limited sample size of 32 bytes for frequency analysis.  Some of 
these tests could possibly be redundant because a new S-box is used for every block; 
however, a single weak S-box could theoretically make the CAC weaker than Rijndael 
alone. 
3.2.1.  Bit Change and Avalanche Criteria. 
S-boxes are typically compared with various avalanche criteria.  In his paper  
"Avalanche and Bit Independence Properties for the Ensembles of Randomly Chosen nxn 
S-Boxes" [29], Isil Virgili found that it is unrealistic to expect most S-boxes to meet the 
strict avalanche criterion (SAC) and more realistic to accept S-boxes within an error 
range.  This interpretation of the SAC and CAC led to the design of two simpler tests 
strictly for S-box avalanche testing, as opposed to entire cryptosystem testing.  To meet 
the criteria of this interpretation of SAC and CAC based on Isil Virgili's research, the 
numbers should always indicate about 50% bit changes in the results.   
The first test counts the number of bit changes for all 256 input and output byte 
combinations in the generated S-box.  Figure 48 shows the results of the first tests when 
comparing the 128 possible generated S-boxes and 256 dynamic S-boxes.  Based on the 
limited data for Static S-boxes, the results suggest that the dynamic S-boxes perform 
nearly as well with just a little more variance.  
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The second test counts the number of bit changes between each input byte and its 
outputs when each bit is flipped.  Figure 49 shows a comparison between the 128 static 
and 256 dynamic S-boxes.  This test, while closely related to the first, is closer to a 
second order bit-independence test.  Interestingly enough, the Galois generated S-boxes 
have a constant avalanche of 0.504883, which is due to their 9-term arithmetic 
construction [20].    The dynamic S-boxes perform nearly as well, with a similar mean 
and slightly more variance. 
 
Figure 48.  Average per byte bit changes in static and dynamic S-boxes. 
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3.2.2. Non-Linearity Measures. 
Non-linearity is a typical measure of S-boxes, and the S-boxes generated by 
Rijndael are said to have [9] "optimum worst-case non-linearity properties".  
Non-linearity seems like a good metric for the comparisons of dynamic and static 
S-boxes.  Typically, accidental affine operations are often weaknesses in new 
cryptosystems.  Non-linearity can be thought of as the absence of that type of weakness.  
It is basically a measure of the number of bits that must change in the truth table of a 
Boolean function to reach the closest affine function [30]. According to Terry Ritter [31], 
non-linearity is measured by forming the 1-bit wide truth tables for each output bit and 
then performing a Fast Walsh-Hadamard transform (FWT) on the truth table to find the 
correlation count between the truth table and the set of affine functions.  The functions 
for measuring non-linearity were ported to C++ from Terry Ritter's JavaScript FWT and 
non-linearity testing sources with the authors permission.  The FWT calculates the 
difference away from the affine functions, and the largest distance possible from any 
affine function is plus or minus one half of the bits, or 128 in this 8-bit case.   
 
Figure 49.  Comparison of dynamic and static S-boxes avalanche. 
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That said, the reported minimum non-linearity for an S-Box is calculated as     
2n/2 – abs(maxDist), where n is the number of bits.  Though each entry in the S-box will 
have a non-linearity measure, only the minimum is reported for a worst-case comparison.  
Based on the results of this test, it is interesting to note that all 128 of the statically 
generated S-boxes have the same minimum non-linearity (minNL = 112).  This is a direct 
result of the way the S-box is generated by its 9-term algebraic expression [20].  Figure 
50 shows the resulting minimum non-linearity measures on some dynamically generated 
S-boxes.  A value of 128 is the unreachable best-case upper bound of non-linearity.  
While the 128 static S-boxes perform very well at 112, the dynamic S-boxes perform 
decently with an average minimum non-linearity of 99 based on 256 trials. 
 
Based on research by Terry Ritter [30] (Figure 51), the distribution of minimum 
non-linearity for random 8-bit S-boxes has an average of 100, which is supported by the 
experimental results of the dynamic S-boxes (Figure 52).  One of the original indicators 
 
Figure 50.  Comparison of minimum non-linearity for dynamic and static S-boxes. 
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showing the importance of the uniform dispersion properties of the BounceGas rule 
comes from comparing the distribution of MinNL under randomly chosen Margolus 




Figure 52.  Experimental results showing distribution of MinNL for CA 
generated S-boxes under the BounceGas rule with threshold 127.  500 trials. 
  0.35  |                 *         
  0.3   |                 *         
  0.25  |              *  *         
  0.2   |              *  *  *      
  0.15  |              *  *  *      
  0.1   |           *  *  *  *      
  0.05  |        *  *  *  *  *      
  0.00  |     *  *  *  *  *  *  *   
  Prob  +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-- 
             92    96    100   104  
                 Nonlinearity       
Figure 51. Nonlinearity Distribution in random 8-Bit Tables as 
reported in Terry Ritters Research. [30][31] 
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The results (Figure 53) of this test clearly shows that some Margolus rules can 
lead to very linear S-boxes, which would be useless from a security standpoint.  The test 
modified the S-box based on a random rule for 50 generations.  It then output the 
minumum non-linearity on the CA modified S-box This was the test that showed the 
importance of having good CA rules (like BounceGas) for the Margolus CA transition 
function. 
Though the BounceGas rule performs decently well at generating non-linear 
S-boxes, it still has a lower non-linearity than the specially crafted Galois generated static 
S-boxes which had non-linearity 112.  Terry Ritter's research [30] on random 4-bit 
permutation S-boxes for DES-like Feistel ciphers, shows that randomizing the S-boxes is 
a very bad idea.  He does conclude, however, that random 8-bit permutation S-boxes are 
very rarely weak, and the bad stigma about randomized S-boxes is most likely for the 
special case of DES or 4-bit S-boxes.  That said, the CA generated S-boxes with the 
average MinNL of 99 appear to be acceptable. 
 
Figure 53.  Distribution of MinNL for CA generated S-boxes under 
random rules with threshold 127.  500 Trials 
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3.3.  Analyzing the CAC Output and Performance. 
The overall performance of the resulting CAC can be analyzed and compared to 
Rijndael in many ways.  If the CAC design is not any weaker than the Rijndael design, 
then the results should be very similar in both cases. 
3.3.1.  Maurer's Universal Statistical Test. 
Maurer's universal statistical test is typically used to measure the performance of 
random bit generators [32].  It reports a value representing how well the bit stream could 
be compressed by looking for patterns in the input.  With enough input data, Maurer's test 
is said to be universal in that it can be performed instead of the five common tests: 
mono-bit test, two-bit test, runs test, poker test, and the auto-correlation test [32].  If we 
assume any well-encrypted cipher text will look like random data, then this test can be 
applied to compare cipher text outputs.  The algorithm (Figure 54.) [32] reports a value of 
about 7.18 for true uniform random 8-bit data streams, with lower values showing less 
random data.  An internal parameter to the statistic is the number of bits in each entry, 
represented by L.  Computing the test statistic requires a large amount of data, or roughly 
1000 * 2L L-bit blocks.  Q represents the number of blocks used to initialize the 2L table 
entries, and should be of size at least 10*2L.  K represents the other 990 * 2L blocks to be 
processed, and Ai represents the actual L-bit entries from the random source.   
 
 
Figure 54.  Computing Maurer's Test Statistic [32] 
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The results of Maurer's Universal Statistical test (with L=8) on the cipher text 
outputs with various encryption parameters show uniform random outputs across the 
board (Table 4), which implies that the CAC is not weaker than Rijndael alone. 
 
3.3.2.  Entropy and Conditional Entropy. 
Shannon entropy, or information entropy, is a measure of the amount of 
information contained in a random variable [33].   A constant pattern has zero entropy, 
indicating that zero bits of data are required to transfer such a message.  English text 
typically has entropy of about 1.5 bits per letter, while a truly random string of characters 
would have entropy of 8.0.  The standard entropy formula [34] (Figure 56a) provides 
nearly the same information the Maurer's test reports, but the conditional entropy (Figure 
56b) [35] formula is often used as a measure of secrecy.  Conditional entropy provides a 
measure of the similarity between two discrete random variables, which can be used to 
determine whether the two variables are independent or to what extent they are dependent 
on each other.  The conditional entropy between a plaintext and its cipher text would 
report a value of zero if the cipher text were to provide all the information necessary to 
undo the encryption, as is the case with the simple shift affine cipher.  A cryptosystem is 
said to have complete secrecy if the conditional entropy between the texts and the entropy 
  Generations Maurer's 
Moby-Dick.txt 0 3.8891 
Ciph-Rijndael 0 7.1848 
Ciph-CAC 1 7.1878 
Ciph-CAC 2 7.1824 
Ciph-CAC 3 7.1809 
Ciph-CAC 4 7.1867 
Ciph-CAC 5 7.1868 
Ciph-CAC 10 7.1831 
UniformRandom 0 7.1850 
Figure 55.  Maurer's experimental results comparing 
CAC outputs to english text and random uniform data. 
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of the original file are equal, which implies that a one-time pad (OTP) is the only 
perfectly secret cipher. 
 
 The entropy and conditional entropy were used compare cipher texts produced by 
Rijndael, the CAC, and an OTP cipher.  To provide a more clear comparison between the 
systems, the input data was aligned along a block boundary and all CBC and padding 
code was removed.  The OTP cipher was simulated by generating a random block of data 
for the cipher text.  The results (Table 4) indicate that the CAC is no weaker than 
Rijndael and that both perform nearly as well as the OTP, which was somewhat 
unexpected.  The results also suggest that increasing the number of CA generations does 
not have much effect on the results.  Thus as far as conditional entropy and secrecy are 
concerned, the CAC and Rijndael perform extremely well, and the differences between 




Figure 56.  Definition of entropy 
a) H(X) and conditional entropy [34]  
b) H(Y|X) [35] 
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3.3.3.  Data Histogram Results. 
As mentioned previously, the simplest and most naïve method of judging the 
strength of a cipher is the data histogram approach.  Any cipher with a chance of being 
better than the weakest affine shift ciphers will have a uniform data histogram for all its 
cipher text output.  Statistical analysis of the cipher text output distributions would 
merely repeat the results of the entropy and Maurer's tests, therefore only a simple 
graphical check was performed (Figure 57).  It is important to point out that all 
algorithms that utilize an S-box – ignoring their diffusion steps – are all nearly as weak as 
shift ciphers.  Simply performing the same substitutions for each byte of the file allows 
the input and output frequencies to be directly compared.  While this is only a weakness 
in a cipher that doesn’t have a diffusion step, each block will have a unique histogram if 
this CAC had no diffusion step.  This fact reduces the amount of data that can be 








3.3.4.  Compression Results. 
The compression test is a simple test that should support the conclusions of the 
Maurer's and entropy tests.  Based on the entropy of around 7.99 for all of the cipher 
texts, the compressed file should be larger than the uncompressed file.  If the 




Figure 57.  Comparison of original and output data histograms. 
The two ciphertext histograms appear equally uniform. 
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flawed (as in ECB mode).  Based on the results of compressing with BZIP2 (Table 5), the 
CAC passes this simple compression test. 
 
3.3.5.  Time Analysis and Profiling Results. 
Based on the analysis done thus far, the cryptosystem is not weaker than Rijndael.  
If the perceived weaknesses in the standard static S-box approach ever lead toward a 
cryptanalysis technique for breaking Rijndael, then the CAC design will be the more 
secure algorithm.  If this were to happen, there is still the question of whether or not the 
extra processing required to dynamically modify the S-box in this way is worth the added 
security.  For this, a profile of the code while encrypting a file was performed (Table 6). 
 
These timings were taken to microsecond accuracy and the offer some startling 
results.  The processing of the simple CA code with one generation per block adds quite a 
bit of overhead when encrypting a 4MB file.  A 32% reduction in throughput was 
unnexpected.  There are a lot of factors causing these performance issues.  With a 4MB 
 
Table 5.  Experimental Results of BZIP2 compression test. 
 
Table 6.  Temporal differences between static and dynamic 
S-boxes while encrypting a 4mb file with one generation/block. 
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file, there are 131,072 256-bit blocks, which corresponds directly to the number of 
generations performed.  The overhead of generating a new S-box for each block of data, 
was much larger than expected.   
A simple modification to the design would provide another user parameter to 
control the number of blocks processed between CA S-box modifications.  Another factor 
is the large number of swaps being performed by the BounceGas rule.  As shown in 
Figure 47, there is an average of 48 swaps performed per generation with the default 
threshold value of 127.  Retaining synchronization between the S-Box and Inverse S-Box 
doubles this to an average of 96 swaps per generation.  With a 4MB file with 131,072 
blocks, the algorithm would perform 12,582,912 swaps on average with the default 
threshold of 127, meaning 12 million function calls.  However, if the user modifies this 
threshold away from the default mid-way point of 127, the number of swaps per 
generation will always be reduced (on average). 
 The time analysis also points out the existence of a hypothetical problem 
somewhere in the implementation.  The difference in encryption and decryption time is a 
commonly warned against problem.  If an attacker were able to perform similar profiling 
or timing analysis, they may be able to exploit this information to gain limited knowledge 
of the plaintext or internal state.  While this highly unlikely situation is mostly a hardware 
issue, timing attacks should not be ignored.  In theory, each encryption and decryption 
function should use the same number of cpu cycles.   
 Based on these results and the typical non-linearity measures of random 8-bit 
S-boxes (Figure 51) [30], one idea stands out.  If a future novel cryptosystem were to use 
dynamic S-boxes, it may be more efficient to just perform random permutations on the 
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4.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Cellular Automata Cryptosystem designed for this thesis has been shown to 
operate as it was intended.  The analysis performed indicates that the CAC design is not 
weaker than the original Rijndael algorithm.  While the implementation may not be 
perfectly secure, as it wasn't a major focus, it does offer enhancements over numerous 
currently deployed AES/Rijndael products.  This is based on the implementations' 
dynamic generation of the initial S-Box, which partially defeats the S-Box blanking 
attacks described by Kerrins and Kursawe [22].  It is important to note, however, that the 
implementation requires static table of the Galois generators to be stored in the binary.  
Though there is a minor checksum and verification performed on this table at program 
load, truly protecting the implementation from S-Box blanking requires further operating 
system level protections as Kerrins suggested.  Thus the design only partially protects 
against S-Box blanking. 
On the subject of the possible weaknesses of Rijndael's S-Box [20] [21], 
specifically the "9-term algebraic expression" mentioned by Jingmei and Fuller, the 
design fully protects against this.  If the algebraic construction of Rijndael's S-Box was 
ever used to successfully attack AES/Rijndael, or was discovered to be an advantage for 
the NSA, a cryptosystem that implements dynamic S-boxes will undoubtedly be 
preferred.  This of course assumes that the CA generated S-boxes very rarely have an 
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algebraic expression at all.  The results of the Minimum Non-Linearity tests, wherein the 
CA generated S-boxes had an average of 99 and the Rijndael S-Boxes had a static value 
of 112, may raise some questions about the strength of CA S-boxes even though research 
suggests it is a non-issue for 8-bit S-boxes [31]. 
All data suggests that this system is far more resistant to cryptanalysis than the 
already "unbreakable" 256-bit Rijndael implementation with a single S-Box.  However, it 
should be noted that choice of the standard S-box was chosen for programmatic  
performance tricks.  This design removes the ability to cut corners on performance, and 
also adds significant overhead.  The 32% reduction in encryption and decryption speed, 
with only a single generation per block, was quite unexpected.  In its current form, the 
Margolus automata rules add too much overhead to the process, especially since a main 
idea behind this thesis was that CA are very fast and Margolus Automata are the fastest 
of the fast.  This was a disappointing realization.  Furthermore, taking advantage of the 
blistering speeds obtained using Cellular Automata in hardware ASICs, would require a 
major change to the design.  It is not known at this time how the border wrapping 
Margolus functions could be modified to work on hardware without requiring excess 
connections to create the torus-like wrapping currently being used.  Moreover, as Terry 
Ritter's research [31] was verified here, any random permutation of an 8-bit S-box will on 
average have a minimum non-linearity of 100.  This means that there may be no point to 
using a CA to modify the S-box at all if you can programmatically generate random 
permutations (based on some key) more efficiently.  This could remove the need for a 
generator table, the entire automata, the performance issues, and the ASIC deficiencies. 
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Having successfully solved some of the perceived issues with Rijndael's S-box and 
showing a secure use of CA in cryptography, the design is a success in all but 
performance and efficient hardware implementation.  Showing one possible secure use of 
CA in cryptography was a major focus of this thesis, as was enhancing Rijndael's already 
powerful S-box.  The ideas employed here, may be of interest to future cryptographers 
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const uint8_t generators[] = 
    { /* The Galois Generator Table */ 
      0x03, 0x05, 0x06, 0x09, 0x0b, 0x0e, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x17, 
0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1c, 0x1e, 0x1f, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x27, 0x28, 0x2a, 
0x2c, 0x30, 0x31, 0x3c, 0x3e, 0x3f, 0x41, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48, 0x49, 
0x4b, 0x4c, 0x4e, 0x4f, 0x52, 0x54, 0x56, 0x57, 0x58, 0x59, 0x5a, 0x5b, 
0x5f, 0x64, 0x65, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x70, 0x71, 0x76, 0x77, 0x79, 
0x7a, 0x7b, 0x7e, 0x81, 0x84, 0x86, 0x87, 0x88, 0x8a, 0x8e, 0x8f, 0x90, 
0x93, 0x95, 0x96, 0x98, 0x99, 0x9b, 0x9d, 0xa0, 0xa4, 0xa5, 0xa6, 0xa7, 
0xa9, 0xaa, 0xac, 0xad, 0xb2, 0xb4, 0xb7, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xba, 0xbe, 0xbf, 
0xc0, 0xc1, 0xc4, 0xc8, 0xc9, 0xce, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xd6, 0xd7, 0xda, 0xdc, 
0xdd, 0xde, 0xe2, 0xe3, 0xe5, 0xe6, 0xe7, 0xe9, 0xea, 0xeb, 0xee, 0xf0, 






    galois(); //Default constructor 
    ~galois(); //Default Destructor 
 
private: 
    uint8_t gmul ( uint8_t a, uint8_t b ); //Function for multiplying 
two numbers without lookup table 
    uint8_t gmulLookup ( uint8_t a, uint8_t b ); //Function for 
multiplying two numbers with lookup table 
    uint8_t gmulInverse ( uint8_t in ); //Function for calculating the 
multiplicative inverse of a number 
    uint8_t sub ( uint8_t in ); //Function for substituting a byte with 
the sbox 
    uint8_t rcon ( uint8_t in ); //Function for exponentiating 2^in 
used in key expansion 
    uint8_t ROTL ( uint8_t x, uint8_t s ); //Function for left circular 
shifting an 8bit number s times 
    uint8_t ROTR ( uint8_t x, uint8_t s ); //Function for right 
circular shifting an 8bit number s times 
 
    void gmixColumn ( uint8_t *r ); //Rijndaels MixColumn step 
    void invGmixColumn ( uint8_t *r ); //Rijndaels Inverse MixColumn 
step 
    void rotateStateL ( int offset ); //RotateStateLeft, takes offset 
into one dimensional state variable 
    void rotateStateR ( int offset ); //RotateStateRight, takes offset 
into one dimensional state variable 
    void shiftRows(); //Calls RotateStateL to perform the neccessary 
shifts for 256-bit blocks 
    void invShiftRows(); //Calls RotateStateR to perform the neccessary 
unshifts for 256-bit blocks 
    void mixColumns(); //Calls gMixColumn to perform mixing on each 
column 
    void invMixColumns(); //Calls invGmixColumn to perform unmixing on 
each column 
    void substituteBytes(); //Substitutes bytes with their SBox lookup 
    void invSubstituteBytes(); //UnSubstitutes bytes with their invSBox 
lookup 
    void addRoundKey ( int i ); //Adds (xors) the indicated roundkey to 
the state 
 
    void textUserPrompt(); //Prompts the user for required input 
    void initCipher(); //Initializes the core functionality of the 
cipher 
    void initIV(); //Initializes the IV for CBC Mode 
    void doEncryptDecrypt(); //Calls encrypt or decrypt function based 
on user input 
    void generateLogTables(); //Generates the Logarithm tables for the 
Galois Field 
    void generateGmulInverse(); //Generates the gmulInverse table 
    void generateSBoxes(); //Generates the SBox and InvSBox 
    void schedule_core ( uint8_t *in, uint8_t i ); //Function used in 
key expansion 
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    void rotate ( uint8_t *in ); //Rotate function used in key 
expansion 
    void expand_key(); //Key Expansion function 
    void doRounds(); //Rijndaels doRounds function 
    void doInvRounds(); //Rijndaels doInvRounds function 
    void encrypt(); //Encryption function with File IO and Padding 
    void decrypt(); //Decryption function with File IO and DePadding 
    void doCBCXOR(); //CBC function to XOR over the state 
    void doCBCUpdate ( uint8_t source[32], uint8_t dest[32] ); //CBC 
function for updating the IV 
    void padState ( int padVal ); //Function for Padding the State 
    void padFullState ( int padVal ); //Function for adding an entire 
pad block 
 
    uint8_t hexToInt ( char first, char second ); //Function for 
converting user hex key input into real hex numbers 
    bool verifyGenerators(); //Function for verifying the static 
generator table 
 
    uint8_t ltable[256]; //Log Table 
    uint8_t etable[256]; //Exponentiation Table 
    uint8_t gmulInv[256]; //Multiplicative Inverse Table 
    uint8_t SBox[256]; //SBox 
    uint8_t SBoxInv[256]; //Inverse SBox 
    uint8_t key[480]; //The Key and expanded key space 
 
    uint8_t state[32]; //The state, or current block 
    uint8_t IV[32]; //The initialization vector 
    uint8_t IVTemp[32]; //Space for a temporary IV 
    int rounds; //Number of rounds in the encryption 
 
    bool encryptBool; //Boolean from user input 
    bool runGensBeforeKey; //CA Key expansion modifying boolean from 
user input 
    int galoisGenSeed; //Galois Generator seed from user input 
    int generationsPerBlock; //CA Generations from user input 
    int keyGenerationsPerBlock; //KeyCA Generations from user input 
    int threshCA; //CA Threshold from user input 
    char ciphFile[33]; //Filename for ciphertext 
    char textFile[33]; //Filename for plaintext 
    char userKey[32]; //User input key space 
 
    margolis *theCA; //The SBox and InvSBox Modifying CA 
    margolisSingle *theKeyCA; //The Key modifying CA 


















    /*Default Constructor*/ 
    verifyGenerators(); //Verify the Generator Tables 
 
    /*Blank all arrays*/ 
    fill ( key, key + 480, 0 ); 
    fill ( ltable, ltable + 256, 0 ); 
    fill ( etable, etable + 256, 0 ); 
    fill ( gmulInv, gmulInv + 256, 0 ); 
    fill ( SBox, SBox + 256, 0 ); 
    fill ( SBoxInv, SBoxInv + 256, 0 ); 
    fill ( state, state + 32, 0 ); 
    fill ( IV, IV + 32, 0 ); 
    fill ( IVTemp, IVTemp + 32, 0 ); 
    fill ( userKey, userKey + 32, 0 ); 
    fill ( ciphFile, ciphFile + 33, 0 ); 
    fill ( textFile, textFile + 33, 0 ); 
 
    textUserPrompt(); //Prompt for User Parameters 
 
    initCipher();  //Initialize the cipher 





    rounds = 14;  //Set Default Rounds 
    generateLogTables(); //Generate the Log Tables 
    generateGmulInverse(); //Generate the Multiplicative Inverse Tables 
    generateSBoxes();  //Generate the S-Box and Inverse S-Box 
    theCA = new margolis(); //Create the S-Box CA instance 
    theCA->setParams ( SBox, SBoxInv, 16, 16, threshCA ); //Set the 
user chosen parameters 
 
    theTest = new tests ( SBox, SBoxInv ); //Create the Tests class 
 
    if ( runGensBeforeKey ) //If user chose to modify key expansion 
    { 
        theCA->doGenerations ( generationsPerBlock ); //Modify the S-
Box during initialization 
    } 
 
    expand_key(); //Expand the Users Key 
 
    theKeyCA = new margolisSingle(); //Create the Key CA instance 




uint8_t galois::hexToInt ( char first, char second ) 
{ 
    /*Method for converting ascii hex characters to numbers*/ 
    char hex[3]; 
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    char *stop; 
    hex[0] = first; 
    hex[1] = second; 
    hex[2] = 0; 





    /*Prompt the User for their options*/ 
    char input[129]; 
    fill ( input, input + 129, 0 ); 
 
    char choice = 0; 
 
    do 
    { 
        cout << "Encrypt or Decrypt? (e,d) " << endl; 
        choice = cin.get(); 
    } 
 
    while ( ( choice != 'e' ) && ( choice != 'd' ) ); 
 
    cin.ignore(); 
 
    encryptBool = ( choice == 'e' ); 
 
    do 
    { 
        cout << "Would you like to enter a 1)Passphrase or 2)Key? " << 
endl; 
        choice = cin.get(); 
    } 
 
    while ( ( choice != '1' ) && ( choice != '2' ) ); 
 
    cin.ignore(); 
 
    if ( choice == '1' ) 
    { 
        cout << "***Input 32 Ascii Characters****" << endl; 
        cin.getline ( input, 33 ); 
 
        for ( int i = 0;i < 32;i++ ) 
        { 
            userKey[i] = input[i]; 
        } 
    } 
 
    else 
    { 
        do 
        { 
            cout << "***********************Input 64 Hex Digit 
Key*******************" << endl; 
            cin.getline ( input, 65 ); 
        } 
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        while ( cin.gcount() != 65 ); 
 
        for ( int i = 0;i < 64;i += 2 ) 
        { 
            userKey[i/2] = hexToInt ( input[i], input[i+1] ); 
        } 
    } 
 
    do 
    { 
        cout << "***TextFile Name: <=32 Chars****" << endl; 
        cin.getline ( textFile, 33 ); 
    } 
 
    while ( cin.gcount() == 1 ); 
 
    do 
    { 
        cout << "***CiphFile Name: <=32 Chars****" << endl; 
        cin.getline ( ciphFile, 33 ); 
    } 
 
    while ( cin.gcount() == 1 ); 
 
    do 
    { 
        cout << "Enter your galois generator number (0-127)" << endl; 
        cin >> galoisGenSeed; 
    } 
 
    while ( ( galoisGenSeed > 127 ) || ( galoisGenSeed < 0 ) ); 
 
    cin.ignore(); 
 
    galoisGenSeed = generators[galoisGenSeed]; 
 
    do 
    { 
        cout << "Enter the number of generations per block: " << endl; 
        cin >> generationsPerBlock; 
        cin.ignore(); 
    } 
 
    while ( ( generationsPerBlock < 0 ) || ( generationsPerBlock > 128 
) ); 
 
    do 
    { 
        cout << "Enter the number of key generations per block: " << 
endl; 
        cin >> keyGenerationsPerBlock; 
        cin.ignore(); 
    } 
 
    while ( ( keyGenerationsPerBlock < 0 ) || ( keyGenerationsPerBlock 
> 128 ) ); 
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    if ( generationsPerBlock > 0 ) do 
        { 
            cout << "Enter the threshold value for the Automata: (64-
192) (127 RECOMMENDED) " << endl; 
            cin >> threshCA; 
            cin.ignore(); 
        } 
 
        while ( ( threshCA <= 63 ) || ( threshCA >= 193 ) ); 
 
    choice = 'n'; 
 
    if ( generationsPerBlock > 0 ) do 
        { 
            cout << "Would you like to run (" << dec << 
generationsPerBlock << ") generations before key expansion? (y,n) " << 
endl; 
            choice = cin.get(); 
            cin.ignore(); 
        } 
 
        while ( ( choice != 'y' ) && ( choice != 'n' ) ); 
 





    /*Default Destructor, Delete instantiated objects*/ 
    delete theCA; 
    delete theKeyCA; 





    /*CBC Initialization Vector initilization Method*/ 
    clock_t start_tick; //Create clock object 
 
    for ( int x = 0;x < 32;x++ ) //For the size of our block 
    { 
        state[x] = 0; //Blank Entry 
        start_tick = clock(); //Set clocks current time 
 
        while ( clock() == start_tick ) //While still current time 
        { 
            state[x]++; //Increment this entry in the block 
        } 
    } 
 
    doRounds(); //Encrypt the state with the users key 
    doCBCUpdate ( state, IV ); //Update the IV 
 
    for ( int x = 0;x < 32;x++ ) //For the size of our block 
    { 
        state[x] = 0; //Blank Entry 
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        start_tick = clock(); //Set clocks current time 
 
        while ( clock() == start_tick ) //While still current time 
        { 
            state[x]++; //Increment this entry in the block 
        } 
    } 
 
    doCBCXOR(); //CBC XOR with our first IV 
    doRounds(); //Encrypt the IV with users key 
 





    /*Method for simply calling Encrypt or Decrypt based on user 
input*/ 
    if ( encryptBool ) encrypt(); 





    /*The Encryption Method*/ 
    initIV(); //Initialize the IV 
 
    struct stat results; //Get the FileSize 
    int filesize = stat ( textFile, &results ); 
    filesize = results.st_size; 
 
    ifstream text ( textFile, ios::in | ios::binary ); //Open the Input 
and Output Files 
    ofstream ciph ( ciphFile, ios::out | ios::binary ); 
 
    assert ( text ); //Assert that the files were opened 
    assert ( ciph ); 
 
    if ( filesize == 0 ) //Refused to Encrypt an Empty File 
    { 
        cout << "Input file size is zero! Not Encrypting " << endl; 
        exit ( 0 ); 
    } 
 
    ciph.write ( ( char* ) IV, sizeof ( IV ) ); //Write the IV as the 
first block of the ciphertext 
 
    for ( int z = 0;z <= filesize;z += 32 ) //For all blocks in the 
file 
    { 
        text.read ( ( char* ) state, sizeof ( state ) ); //Read a block 
of text 
 
        if ( z + 32 > filesize ) //If last block 
        { 
            int padVal = 32 - ( filesize % 32 ); //Calculate the number 
of bytes needed to fill the last block 
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            if ( padVal != 32 ) //If the file didn't end as a perfect 
multiple of the block size (32) 
            { 
                padState ( padVal ); //Pad the Last Block to fill it 
out 
                doCBCXOR(); //Do CBC XOR as usual 
                doRounds(); //Do Encryption rounds as Usual 
                theCA->doGenerations ( generationsPerBlock ); //Run the 
CA on the SBox as usual 
                theKeyCA->doGenerations ( keyGenerationsPerBlock ); 
//Run the CA on the Key as usual 
                doCBCUpdate ( state, IV ); //Update the IV with 
encrypted block 
                ciph.write ( ( char* ) state, sizeof ( state ) ); 
//Output the last block 
                padFullState ( padVal ); //Prepare the final padding 
block 
            } 
            else 
            { 
                padFullState ( 0 ); //Only adding the final padding 
block because file was a multiple of block size 
            } 
        } 
 
        doCBCXOR(); //Either doing normal processing or finishing final 
padding block 
        doRounds(); //Do Encryption rounds 
        theCA->doGenerations ( generationsPerBlock ); //Do S-Box 
Generations 
        theKeyCA->doGenerations ( keyGenerationsPerBlock ); //Do Key 
Generations 
        doCBCUpdate ( state, IV ); //Update the IV with the encrypted 
block 
 
        ciph.write ( ( char* ) state, sizeof ( state ) ); //Output the 
block 
    } 
 
    text.close(); //Close the files 
    ciph.close(); 
} 
 
void galois::padState ( int padVal ) 
{ 
    /*Method to pad a block to fill it up with padVal + 32*/ 
    for ( int i = 31;i >= 32 - padVal;i-- ) //Starting from the end, 
write as many as needed 
    { 
        state[i] = padVal + 32; //Fill with 32 + Count 
    } 
} 
 
void galois::padFullState ( int padVal ) 
{ 
    /*Method to pad a full block with 32 + Count*/ 
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    for ( int i = 31;i >= 0;i-- ) 
    { 
        state[i] = padVal + 32; //PadVal will be zero if the file was a 
multiple of 32 





    /*Method for encrypting a file*/ 
 
    struct stat results; //Get the FileSize 
    int filesize = stat ( ciphFile, &results ); 
    filesize = results.st_size - 64; //Subtract the IV and Final 
Padding block from the calculations 
 
    ifstream ciph ( ciphFile, ios::in | ios::binary ); //Open the files 
    ofstream text ( textFile, ios::out | ios::binary ); 
 
    assert ( ciph ); //Verify the files are open 
    assert ( text ); 
 
    ciph.read ( ( char* ) IV, sizeof ( IV ) ); //Read the IV from the 
first block of the ciphertext 
 
    for ( int z = 0;z < filesize;z += 32 ) //For all blocks in the file 
    { 
        ciph.read ( ( char* ) state, sizeof ( state ) ); //Read in an 
ciphertext block 
 
        doCBCUpdate ( state, IVTemp ); //Backup this block as the next 
IV 
        doInvRounds(); //Do the Inverse Rounds 
        theCA->doGenerations ( generationsPerBlock ); //Do S-Box CA 
Generations 
        theKeyCA->doGenerations ( keyGenerationsPerBlock ); //Do Key CA 
Generations 
        doCBCXOR(); //Do CBC XOR 
        doCBCUpdate ( IVTemp, IV ); //Update the IV with the temp IV 
 
        if ( z + 32 >= filesize ) //If Final Block 
        { 
            uint8_t finalState[32]; //Create a holding space for the 
final state 
            memcpy ( finalState, state, 32 ); //Copy the state into 
finalState 
 
            ciph.read ( ( char* ) state, sizeof ( state ) ); //Read the 
Final Padding Block 
            doCBCUpdate ( state, IVTemp ); //Update the IVTemp with the 
state 
            doInvRounds(); //Do the Inverse Rounds 
            theCA->doGenerations ( generationsPerBlock ); //Do S-Box CA 
Generations 
            theKeyCA->doGenerations ( keyGenerationsPerBlock ); //Do 
Key CA Generations 
            doCBCXOR(); //Do CBC XOR 
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            if ( state[0] == 32 ) //If the final padding block's last 
entry is 32 
            { 
                text.write ( ( char* ) finalState, 32 ); //Write the 
ENTIRE final state out, original filesize % 32 was 0 
            } 
            else 
            { 
                text.write ( ( char* ) finalState, 32 - ( state[0] % 32 
) ); //Otherwise write out the number of bytes that weren't padding 
            } 
        } 
        else 
        { 
            text.write ( ( char* ) state, sizeof ( state ) ); //Write 
out a normal block of decrypted plain-text, wasnt last block. 
        } 
    } 
 
    text.close(); //Close files 





    /*Do the XOR operation of CBC Mode*/ 
    for ( int i = 0;i < 32;i++ ) state[i] ^= IV[i]; //XOR each state 
entry with the IV 
} 
 
void galois::doCBCUpdate ( uint8_t source[32], uint8_t dest[32] ) 
{ 
    /*Wrapper Method for copying to and from state, IV, IVTemp*/ 





    /*Rijndael DoRounds*/ 
    addRoundKey ( 0 ); //Add Key 0 
 
    for ( int i = 1;i < rounds;i++ ) //For all rounds 
    { 
        substituteBytes(); //S-Box 
        shiftRows(); //Shift 
        mixColumns(); //Mix 
        addRoundKey ( i ); //Add Key i 
    } 
 
    substituteBytes(); //Final Sbu 
    shiftRows(); //Final Shift 






    addRoundKey ( 14 ); //Add Key 14 
    invShiftRows(); //UnShift 
 
    for ( int i = rounds - 1;i > 0;i-- ) //For all Rounds in reverse 
    { 
        invSubstituteBytes(); //Inv S-Box 
        addRoundKey ( i ); //Add Key i 
        invMixColumns(); //UnMix 
        invShiftRows(); //UnShift 
    } 
 
    invSubstituteBytes(); //Inv S-Box 
 





    /*Substitute all bytes in state with their S-Box entries*/ 
    for ( int i = 0;i < 32;i++ ) 
    { 
        state[i] = SBox[state[i]]; 





    /*Substitute all bytes in the state with their Inverse S-Box 
entries*/ 
    for ( int i = 0;i < 32;i++ ) 
    { 
        state[i] = SBoxInv[state[i]]; 
    } 
} 
 
void galois::addRoundKey ( int round ) 
{ 
    /*XOR Key block with state block*/ 
    int location = 32 * round; //Calculate the offset in the expanded 
key 
 
    for ( int i = 0;i < 32;i++ ) //For all entries in the key block 
    { 
        state[i] ^= key[location++]; //Do XOR (addition) 
    } 
} 
 
uint8_t galois::ROTL ( uint8_t x, uint8_t s ) 
{ 
    /*Circular rotate a byte left by s bits*/ 
    return ( uint8_t ) ( ( ( x ) << ( s& ( 8 - 1 ) ) ) | ( ( x ) >> ( 8 
- ( s& ( 8 - 1 ) ) ) ) ); 
} 
 
uint8_t galois::ROTR ( uint8_t x, uint8_t s ) 
{ 
    /*Circular rotate a byte right by s bits*/ 
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    return ( uint8_t ) ( ( ( x ) >> ( s& ( 8 - 1 ) ) ) | ( ( x ) << ( 8 





    /*Method to algorithmically verfiy the generator tables*/ 
    uint8_t check = 0xb7; //Default Check Value 
 
    for ( int c = 0; c < 128; c++ ) //For all entries in the generator 
table 
    { 
        check ^= ROTL ( generators[c], ROTR ( generators[127-c], c ) ); 
//Do some Mixing 
    } 
 
    uint8_t compare = 1; //Algorithmically build compare 
 
    compare = ROTL ( compare, 2 ); 
    compare |= ROTL ( compare, 2 ); 
    compare |= ROTR ( compare, 6 ); 
 
    if ( check != compare ) //If not equal, tables modified 
    { 
        cout << "Error! Generator table has been altered! Check: " << 
hex << ( uint16_t ) check << " Compare: " << hex << ( uint16_t ) 
compare << endl; 
    } 
 
    else 
    { 
        cout << "Generator Tables Verified! Check: " << hex << ( 
uint16_t ) check << " Compare: " << hex << ( uint16_t ) compare << 
endl; 
    } 
} 
 
uint8_t galois::gmul ( uint8_t a, uint8_t b ) 
{ 
    /*Perform multiplication in the galois field*/ 
    uint8_t p = 0; 
    uint8_t hi_bit_set; 
 
    for ( int counter = 0; counter < 8; counter++ ) 
    { 
        if ( ( b & 1 ) == 1 ) 
            p ^= a; 
 
        hi_bit_set = ( a & 0x80 ); 
 
        a <<= 1; 
 
        if ( hi_bit_set == 0x80 ) 
            a ^= 0x1b; 
 
        b >>= 1; 
    } 
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    /*Generate Log Tables with the given Generator Seed*/ 
    etable[0] = 1; 
    etable[255] = 1; 
 
    for ( int c = 1;c < 256;c++ ) 
    { 
        etable[c] = gmul ( etable[c-1], galoisGenSeed ); 
        ltable[etable[c]] = c; 
    } 
} 
 
/*Very fast define Method for performing multiplications with the 
lookup tables*/ 
#define gmulLookupDefine(a, b) 
((a==0)?0:etable[(ltable[a]+ltable[b])%255]) 
 
uint8_t galois::gmulLookup ( uint8_t a, uint8_t b ) 
{ 
    /*Slow Method for performing multiplication with the lookup 
tables*/ 
    return ( a == 0 ) ? 0 : etable[ ( ltable[a] + ltable[b] ) % 255]; 
} 
 
uint8_t galois::gmulInverse ( uint8_t in ) 
{ 
    /*Method for calculating the multiplicative inverse from the lookup 
tables*/ 
    if ( in == 0 ) return 0; 





    /*Method for generating the gmulInverse table*/ 
    gmulInv[0] = 0; 
 
    for ( int c = 1;c < 256;c++ ) //For all 256 divisors 
    { 
        gmulInv[c] = gmulInverse ( c ); //Populate the gmulInv table 
    } 
} 
 
uint8_t galois::sub ( uint8_t in ) 
{ 
    /*Method for generating the S-box entries based on the Generator 
Seed*/ 
    uint8_t s, x; 
    s = x = gmulInv[in]; 
 
    for ( int c = 0; c < 4; c++ ) 
    { 
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        s = ( s << 1 ) | ( s >> 7 ); 
        x ^= s; 
    } 
 
    x ^= galoisGenSeed; 
 





    /*Method for generating the S-Box tables using sub*/ 
    for ( int c = 0;c < 256;c++ ) //For each byte value 0 - 255 
    { 
        SBox[c] = sub ( c ); //Populate the S-Box with its sub value 
        SBoxInv[SBox[c]] = c; //Populate the SBoxInverse location of 
the sub value with the byte value 





    /*Method for performing gmixColumn on all columns of the state*/ 
    uint8_t temp[4]; 
 
    for ( int j = 0;j < 8;j++ ) //For all 8 columns 
    { 
        for ( int i = 0;i < 4;i++ ) //For all 4 entries in a column 
        { 
            temp[i] = state[i*8+j]; //Copy them from the state to temp 
        } 
 
        gmixColumn ( temp ); //Mix temp 
 
        for ( int i = 0;i < 4;i++ ) //For all 4 entries in a column 
        { 
            state[i*8+j] = temp[i]; //Restore them into the state from 
temp 
        } 





    /*Method for performing invGmixColumn on all columns of the state*/ 
    uint8_t temp[4]; 
 
    for ( int j = 0;j < 8;j++ ) //For all 8 columns 
    { 
        for ( int i = 0;i < 4;i++ ) //For all 4 entries in a column 
        { 
            temp[i] = state[i*8+j]; //Copy them from the state to temp 
        } 
 
        invGmixColumn ( temp ); //UnMix temp 
 
        for ( int i = 0;i < 4;i++ ) //For all 4 entries in a column 
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        { 
            state[i*8+j] = temp[i]; //Restore them into the state from 
temp 
        } 
    } 
} 
 
void galois::gmixColumn ( uint8_t *r ) 
{ 
    /*Perform mixColumn on a single column*/ 
 
    uint8_t a[4]; //Make holding location 
    memcpy ( a, r, 4 ); //Copy original into holding 
 
//Perform matrix multiplication by {{2,3,1,1}[15;15;15]} 
    r[0] = gmulLookupDefine ( a[0], 2 ) ^ gmulLookupDefine ( a[3], 1 ) 
^ gmulLookupDefine ( a[2], 1 ) ^ gmulLookupDefine ( a[1], 3 ); 
    r[1] = gmulLookupDefine ( a[1], 2 ) ^ gmulLookupDefine ( a[0], 1 ) 
^ gmulLookupDefine ( a[3], 1 ) ^ gmulLookupDefine ( a[2], 3 ); 
    r[2] = gmulLookupDefine ( a[2], 2 ) ^ gmulLookupDefine ( a[1], 1 ) 
^ gmulLookupDefine ( a[0], 1 ) ^ gmulLookupDefine ( a[3], 3 ); 
    r[3] = gmulLookupDefine ( a[3], 2 ) ^ gmulLookupDefine ( a[2], 1 ) 
^ gmulLookupDefine ( a[1], 1 ) ^ gmulLookupDefine ( a[0], 3 ); 
} 
 
void galois::invGmixColumn ( uint8_t *r ) 
{ 
    /*Perform invGmixColumn on a single column*/ 
 
    uint8_t a[4]; //Make holding location 
    memcpy ( a, r, 4 ); //Copy original into holding 
 
//Perform matrix multiplcation by 
{{14,9,13,11}{11,14,9,13}{13,11,14,9}{9,13,11,14}} 
    r[0] = gmulLookupDefine ( a[0], 14 ) ^ gmulLookupDefine ( a[3], 9 ) 
^ gmulLookupDefine ( a[2], 13 ) ^ gmulLookupDefine ( a[1], 11 ); 
    r[1] = gmulLookupDefine ( a[1], 14 ) ^ gmulLookupDefine ( a[0], 9 ) 
^ gmulLookupDefine ( a[3], 13 ) ^ gmulLookupDefine ( a[2], 11 ); 
    r[2] = gmulLookupDefine ( a[2], 14 ) ^ gmulLookupDefine ( a[1], 9 ) 
^ gmulLookupDefine ( a[0], 13 ) ^ gmulLookupDefine ( a[3], 11 ); 
    r[3] = gmulLookupDefine ( a[3], 14 ) ^ gmulLookupDefine ( a[2], 9 ) 
^ gmulLookupDefine ( a[1], 13 ) ^ gmulLookupDefine ( a[0], 11 ); 
} 
 
void galois::rotateStateR ( int offset ) 
{ 
    /*Method used by shiftRows to scramble rows*/ 
 
    uint8_t temp = state[offset+7]; //Backup last character 
 
    for ( int c = 7;c > 0;c-- ) //Shift all once 
    { 
        state[offset + c] = state[offset + c - 1]; 
    } 
 




void galois::rotateStateL ( int offset ) 
{ 
    /*Method used by invShiftRows to unscramble rows*/ 
 
    uint8_t temp = state[offset]; //backup first character 
 
    for ( int c = 0;c < 7;c++ ) //Shift all once 
    { 
        state[offset + c] = state[offset + c + 1]; 
    } 
 
    state[offset+7] = temp; //Restore last Character (wrapped) 
} 
 
void galois::rotate ( uint8_t *in ) 
{ 
    /*4-byte Rotate method for use in Key Expansion*/ 
    uint8_t temp = in[0]; 
 
    for ( int c = 0;c < 3;c++ ) 
    { 
        in[c] = in[c + 1]; 
    } 
 





    /*ShiftRows method for performing Rijndaels shiftrow for 256-bit 
blocks*/ 
    for ( int i = 1;i < 4;i++ ) //For all 3 rows to be shifted (0 is 
never shifted) 
    { 
        switch ( i ) 
        { 
 
        case 3: 
            rotateStateL ( i*8 ); //Shift Row 3 4 times passing offset 
into state 
 
        case 2: 
            rotateStateL ( i*8 ); 
 
            rotateStateL ( i*8 ); //Shift Row 2 3 times 
 
        case 1: 
            rotateStateL ( i*8 ); //Shift Row one once 
        } 









    for ( int i = 1;i < 4;i++ ) //For all 3 rows to be shifted (0 is 
never shifted) 
    { 
        switch ( i ) 
        { 
 
        case 3: 
            rotateStateR ( i*8 ); //UnShift Row 3 4 times passing 
offset into state 
 
        case 2: 
            rotateStateR ( i*8 ); 
 
            rotateStateR ( i*8 ); //UnShift Row 2 3 times 
 
        case 1: 
            rotateStateR ( i*8 ); //UnShift Row 1 once 
        } 
    } 
} 
 
uint8_t galois::rcon ( uint8_t in ) 
{ 
    /*Method performs the rcon operation (2 exponentiated) for key 
expansion*/ 
    uint8_t c = 1; 
 
    if ( in == 0 ) return 0; //Anything to the 0 is 0 
 
    while ( in != 1 ) 
    { 
        c = gmulLookupDefine ( c, 2 ); //Continuous multiply by 2 
        in--; 
    } 
 
    return c; 
} 
 
void galois::schedule_core ( uint8_t *in, uint8_t i ) 
{ 
    /*Schedule core is used in key expansion*/ 
 
    rotate ( in ); //Rotate all 4 bytes 
 
    for ( int a = 0; a < 4; a++ ) //Substitute all 4 bytes 
    { 
        in[a] = SBox[in[a]]; 
    } 
 





    /*Key Expansion Method*/ 
    for ( int i = 0;i < 32;i++ ) 
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    { 
        key[i] = userKey[i]; //Set first 32 bytes to be the user 
inputted key 
    } 
 
    uint8_t t[4]; //Create temp 4 bytes 
 
    int c = 32; //Start after the user inputted key 
    uint8_t i = 1; //rcon exponentiation values stats at 1 
 
    while ( c < 480 ) //For all expanded eky bytes 
    { 
        for ( int a = 0; a < 4; a++ ) //Base the first 4 bytes on the 
previous key blocks first 4 bytes 
        { 
            t[a] = key[a + c - 4]; 
        } 
 
        if ( c % 32 == 0 ) //If processing the end of a key block 
        { 
            schedule_core ( t, i ); //Call schedule core to modify the 
4 bytes in t 
            i++; 
        } 
 
        if ( c % 32 == 16 ) //If processing the middle of a key block 
        { 
            for ( int a = 0; a < 4; a++ ) //Do a Subsitute for all 4 
bytes 
            { 
                t[a] = SBox[t[a]]; 
            } 
        } 
 
        for ( int a = 0; a < 4; a++ ) //For all 4 bytes 
        { 
            key[c] = key[c - 32] ^ t[a]; //Key keys current entry is 
the result of xoring the last blocks 4 bytes and t 
            c++; 
        } 










#define getCellInv(x,y) invSBox[SBox[fixX(x)+fixY(y)*width]] //Define 
for getting value from InvSBox 
#define getCell(x,y) SBox[fixX(x)+fixY(y)*width] //Define for getting 
vlue from SBox 
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#define fixX(x) ((width + (x))%width) //Define for Fixing X values 
(border wrapping) 
#define fixY(y) ((height + (y))%height) //Define for Fixing Y values 
(border wrapping) 
 
#define swapDiag1(x,y) swap(x,y,x+1,y+1) //Defines for calling swap 
Method for different swaps 
#define swapDiag2(x,y) swap(x+1,y,x,y+1) 
#define swapHoriz1(x,y) swap(x,y,x+1,y) 
#define swapHoriz2(x,y) swap(x,y+1,x+1,y+1) 
#define swapVert1(x,y) swap(x,y,x,y+1) 
#define swapVert2(x,y) swap(x+1,y,x+1,y+1) 
 
class margolis //Basic functionality Margolis Class for use with SBox 
and InvSBox (see MargolisSingle) 
{ 
public: 
    margolis(); //Default Constructor 
    ~margolis(); //Default Destructor 
    virtual void setParams ( uint8_t *sboxz, uint8_t *invsboxz, int 
widthz, int heightz, int threshz ); //Method for setting parameters for 
normal Margolis 




    virtual void swap ( int x1, int y1, int x2, int y2 ); //Method for 
performing swaps of values in neighborhood 
    void doTransition ( int x, int y, uint8_t currState ); //Method for 
performing the neccessary transition rules for the current 
configuration 
    uint8_t getConfiguration ( int i, int j ); //Method for reporting 
the current configuration 
    void setupRules(); //Method for initializing the default rules 
 
    uint8_t *SBox; //Pointer to SBox (Normal Margolis), or Key (Single 
Margolis) to be used as the CA Map 
    uint8_t *invSBox; //Pointer to InvSBox (Normal Margolis), or NULL 
(Single Margolis) to be used as the CA Map 
    bool rules[16][6]; //Rules Matrix 16 configurations possible for 
each 
 
    bool evenodd; //Variable for storing current even or odd for 
Margolis Neighborhood 
    int thresh; //Threshhold value for determining if a cell is on or 
off 
    int height; //Height of the CA Map (for 2d indexing into a 1d map) 
    int width; //Width of the CA Map (for 2d indexing into a 1d map) 
}; 
 
class margolisSingle : public margolis //Single Margolis class for use 
with Key array 
{ 
public: 
    void swap ( int x1, int y1, int x2, int y2 ); //Redefined swap 
Method that doesn't attempt to mix an inverse box 
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    void setParams ( uint8_t *keyBoxz, int widthz, int heightz, int 















{} //Unused Default Destructor 
 
margolis::margolis() 




    /*Setup the BounceGas Rules for the Automata and initialize 
EvenOdd*/ 
 
    evenodd = true; 
 
    for ( int i = 0;i < 16;i++ ) for ( int j = 0;j < 6;j++ ) 
rules[i][j] = false; 
    rules[1][0] = true; 
    rules[2][1] = true; 
    rules[4][1] = true; 
    rules[6][2] = true; 
    rules[6][3] = true; 
    rules[7][0] = true; 
    rules[8][0] = true; 
    rules[9][2] = true; 
    rules[9][3] = true; 
    rules[11][1] = true; 
    rules[13][1] = true; 
    rules[14][0] = true; 
} 
 
void margolis::setParams ( uint8_t *sboxz, uint8_t *invsboxz, int 
widthz, int heightz, int threshz ) 
{ 
    /*Set the Parameters and S-Box pointers for the S-box modifying 
CA*/ 
 
    SBox = sboxz; //Set S-Box Pointer 
    invSBox = invsboxz; //Set Inv S-Box Pointer 
    width = widthz; //Set Width 
    height = heightz; //Set Height 
    thresh = threshz; //Set CA Threshold 
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    setupRules(); //Call Setup Rules 
} 
 
void margolisSingle::setParams ( uint8_t *keyBoxz, int widthz, int 
heightz, int threshz ) 
{ 
    /*Set the Parameters and Key Array pointers for the Key modifying 
CA*/ 
 
    SBox = keyBoxz; //Set Key Array pointer 
    width = widthz; //Set Width 
    height = heightz; //Set Height 
    thresh = threshz; //Set CA Threshold 
 
    setupRules(); //Call Setup Rules 
} 
 
void margolisSingle::swap ( int x1, int y1, int x2, int y2 ) 
{ 
    /*Swap method for Key-Modifying CA*/ 
 
    uint8_t temp = getCell ( x1, y1 ); //Swap Key Entries 
    getCell ( x1, y1 ) = getCell ( x2, y2 ); 
    getCell ( x2, y2 ) = temp; 
} 
 
void margolis::swap ( int x1, int y1, int x2, int y2 ) 
{ 
    /*Swap method for S-Box modifying CA*/ 
 
    uint8_t temp = getCellInv ( x1, y1 ); //Swap Inv S-Box Entries 
    getCellInv ( x1, y1 ) = getCellInv ( x2, y2 ); 
    getCellInv ( x2, y2 ) = temp; 
 
    temp = getCell ( x1, y1 ); //Swap S-Box Entries 
    getCell ( x1, y1 ) = getCell ( x2, y2 ); 
    getCell ( x2, y2 ) = temp; 
} 
 
void margolis::doTransition ( int x, int y, uint8_t currState ) 
{ 
    /*Apply the transition rules to the current parition 
    based on its current state*/ 
 
    for ( int i = 0;i < 6;i++ ) //Check all Six Swaps 
    { 
        if ( rules[currState][i] ) //If swap is to be performed 
        { 
            switch ( i ) //Determine Swap and Do it 
            { 
            case 0: 
                swapDiag1 ( x, y ); 
                break; 
            case 1: 
                swapDiag2 ( x, y ); 
                break; 
            case 2: 
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                swapHoriz1 ( x, y ); 
                break; 
            case 3: 
                swapHoriz2 ( x, y ); 
                break; 
            case 4: 
                swapVert1 ( x, y ); 
                break; 
            case 5: 
                swapVert2 ( x, y ); 
                break; 
            } 
        } 
    } 
} 
 
/*GetConfiguration adds up the the values of the cells in the partition 
to a number between 0 and 15*/ 
#define getConfiguration(i,j) ((getCell(i+1,j+1)>thresh?8:0) + 
(getCell(i,j+1)>thresh?4:0) + (getCell(i+1,j)>thresh?2:0) + 
(getCell(i,j)>thresh?1:0)) 
 
void margolis::doGenerations ( int numGens ) 
{ 
    /*Method for performing a number of generations*/ 
 
    for ( int k = 0; k < numGens; k++ ) //For all the generations 
    { 
        evenodd ^= 1; //Invert the EvenOdd Boolean 
 
        for ( int i = evenodd; i < height; i += 2 ) //Start from 
EvenOdd and count by 2s 
        { 
 
            for ( int j = evenodd; j < width; j += 2 ) //Start from 
EvenOdd and count by 2s 
            { 
                doTransition ( i, j, getConfiguration ( i, j ) ); //Do 
the transition for the configuration of the partition 
            } 
        } 


























#define BIT(n) (1 << (n)) 
 




    tests ( uint8_t *sboxz, uint8_t *invsboxz ); //Constructor takes an 
SBox and invSBox pointer 
    ~tests(); //Default Destructor 
 
    void testInvertibility(); //Verifies invertibility between SBox and 
invSBox 
    void testNonLinearity ( bool verbose ); //Reports the Non-Linearity 
measures of the SBox 
    void testBitChanges ( bool verbose ); //Counts the number of bit 
changes between sbox inputs and their outputs 
    void BitARFWT(); //Performs Walsh Hadamard Transform for Non-
Linearity Measure 
    void testDataHistogram ( bool verbose ); //Creates a data-histogram 
file based on an input file 
    void testMidPoints ( bool verbose ); //Reports the MidPoints of the 
On and Off values in the CA SBox 
    void testDistanceToCenter ( bool verbose ); //Reports the Distance 
to the Center of MidPoints of the On and Off values in the CA SBox 
    void testAvalanche ( bool verbose ); //Reports the effects of 
modifying single bits in SBox input data 
    void testAll ( bool verbose ); //Performs all tests 
    void testEntropy ( bool verbose ); //Reports the Entropy of two 
input files and their conditional entropy 
    void printSbox(); //Prints out the SBox 
 
private: 
    uint8_t *sbox; //Pointer to SBox 
    uint8_t *invsbox; //Pointer to InvSBox 
 















tests::tests ( uint8_t *sboxz, uint8_t *invsboxz ) 
{ 
    /*Initialize the Class by setting the pointers*/ 
    sbox = sboxz; 








    /*Function for Printing the S-Box in a 16x16 table*/ 
 
    for ( int i = 0;i < 256;i++ ) 
    { 
        cout << hex << ( uint16_t ) sbox[i] << "\t"; 
 
        if ( ( i + 1 ) % 16 == 0 ) cout << endl; 
    } 
 
    cout << dec; 
} 
 
void tests::testEntropy ( bool verbose ) 
{ 
    /*Function for reporting entropy of X, Y, and X|Y*/ 
    char strXFileName[33]; 
    char strYFileName[33]; 
 
    do 
    { 
        cout << "***XFileName Name: <=32 Chars****" << endl; 
        cin.getline ( strXFileName, 33 ); 
    } 
 
    while ( cin.gcount() == 1 ); 
 
    cout << "X: " << strXFileName << endl; 
 
    do 
    { 
        cout << "***YFileName Name: <=32 Chars****" << endl; 
        cin.getline ( strYFileName, 33 ); 
    } 
 
    while ( cin.gcount() == 1 ); 
 
    cout << "Y: " << strYFileName << endl; 
 
    ifstream X ( strXFileName, ios::in | ios::binary ); 
    ifstream Y ( strYFileName, ios::in | ios::binary ); 
 
    struct stat inputXStats; 
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    struct stat inputYStats; 
 
    stat ( strXFileName, &inputXStats ); 
    stat ( strYFileName, &inputYStats ); 
 
    int inputXByteCount = inputXStats.st_size; 
    int inputYByteCount = inputYStats.st_size; 
 
    if ( inputXByteCount != inputYByteCount ) 
    { 
        cout << "Files must be the same size! " << inputXByteCount << " 
!= " << inputYByteCount << endl; 
        return; 
    } 
 
    uint8_t tempDataX; 
 
    uint8_t tempDataY; 
 
    double probX[256]; 
    double probY[256]; 
 
    double jointProb[256][256]; 
 
    for ( int i = 0;i < 256;i++ ) 
    { 
        probX[i] = 0.0; 
        probY[i] = 0.0; 
 
        for ( int j = 0;j < 256;j++ ) 
        { 
            jointProb[i][j] = 0.0; 
        } 
    } 
 
    for ( int i = 0;i < inputXByteCount;i++ ) 
    { 
        X.read ( ( char* ) &tempDataX, sizeof ( tempDataX ) ); 
        probX[tempDataX]++; 
 
        Y.read ( ( char* ) &tempDataY, sizeof ( tempDataY ) ); 
        probY[tempDataY]++; 
 
        jointProb[tempDataX][tempDataY]++; 
    } 
 
    X.close(); 
 
    Y.close(); 
 
    for ( int i = 0;i < 256;i++ ) 
    { 
        probX[i] /= inputXByteCount; 
 




        probY[i] /= inputYByteCount; 
 
        if ( verbose ) cout << dec << "Yp(" << i << ") = " << probY[i] 
<< endl; 
 
        for ( int j = 0;j < 256;j++ ) 
        { 
            jointProb[i][j] /= inputXByteCount; 
        } 
    } 
 
    double condEntropy = 0.0; 
 
    for ( int i = 0;i < 256;i++ ) 
    { 
        for ( int j = 0;j < 256;j++ ) 
        { 
            if ( ( jointProb[i][j] != 0.0 ) && ( probY[i] != 0.0 ) ) 
            { 
                condEntropy += jointProb[i][j] * log ( probY[i] / 
jointProb[i][j] ); 
            } 
        } 
    } 
 
    condEntropy /= log ( 2.0 ); 
 
    if ( condEntropy <= 0.0 ) condEntropy = 0.0; 
 
    cout << "Cond Entropy = " << condEntropy << endl; 
 
    double entropyX = 0.0; 
 
    double entropyY = 0.0; 
 
    for ( int i = 0;i < 256;i++ ) 
    { 
        if ( probX[i] != 0.0 ) entropyX -= probX[i] * log ( probX[i] ); 
 
        if ( probY[i] != 0.0 ) entropyY -= probY[i] * log ( probY[i] ); 
    } 
 
    entropyX /= log ( 2.0 ); 
 
    entropyY /= log ( 2.0 ); 
    cout << "EntropyX = " << entropyX << endl; 
    cout << "EntropyY = " << entropyY << endl; 
} 
 
void tests::testAll ( bool verbose ) 
{ 
    testMidPoints ( verbose ); 
    testDistanceToCenter ( verbose ); 
    testNonLinearity ( verbose ); 
    testAvalanche ( verbose ); 
    testBitChanges ( verbose ); 




void tests::testDistanceToCenter ( bool verbose ) 
{ 
    double midPointTotalXT = 0; 
    double midPointTotalYT = 0; 
    double midPointCountT = 0; 
    double midPointTotalXF = 0; 
    double midPointTotalYF = 0; 
    double midPointCountF = 0; 
 
    for ( int i = 0;i < 16;i++ ) 
    { 
        for ( int j = 0;j < 16;j++ ) 
        { 
            if ( sbox[i*16+j] > 0x7f ) 
            { 
                midPointCountT++; 
                midPointTotalXT += j; 
                midPointTotalYT += i; 
            } 
 
            else 
            { 
                midPointCountF++; 
                midPointTotalXF += j; 
                midPointTotalYF += i; 
            } 
        } 
    } 
 
    double distanceT = sqrt ( pow ( midPointTotalXT / midPointCountT - 
7, 2 ) + pow ( midPointTotalYT / midPointCountT - 7, 2 ) ); 
 
    double distanceF = sqrt ( pow ( midPointTotalXF / midPointCountF - 
7, 2 ) + pow ( midPointTotalXF / midPointCountF - 7, 2 ) ); 
    cout << "1's Distance from MidPoint = " << distanceT << " 0's 
Distance from MidPoint = " << distanceF << endl; 
//cout << distanceT << ";" << distanceF << endl; 
} 
 
void tests::testMidPoints ( bool verbose ) 
{ 
    double midPointTotalXT = 0; 
    double midPointTotalYT = 0; 
    double midPointCountT = 0; 
    double midPointTotalXF = 0; 
    double midPointTotalYF = 0; 
    double midPointCountF = 0; 
 
    for ( int i = 0;i < 16;i++ ) 
    { 
        for ( int j = 0;j < 16;j++ ) 
        { 
            if ( sbox[i*16+j] > 0x7f ) 
            { 
                midPointCountT++; 
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                midPointTotalXT += j; 
                midPointTotalYT += i; 
            } 
 
            else 
            { 
                midPointCountF++; 
                midPointTotalXF += j; 
                midPointTotalYF += i; 
            } 
        } 
    } 
 
    cout << "MidPoint for 1s: (" << midPointTotalXT / midPointCountT << 
"," << midPointTotalYT / midPointCountT << ") "; 
 
    cout << "MidPoint for 0s: (" << midPointTotalXF / midPointCountF << 
"," << midPointTotalYF / midPointCountF << ")" << endl; 
//cout << midPointTotalXT/midPointCountT << ";" << 
midPointTotalYT/midPointCountT << ";" << midPointTotalXF/midPointCountF 





    for ( int i = 0; i < 256; i++ ) 
    { 
        if ( invsbox[sbox[i]] != i ) 
        { 
            cout << "Wrong value at " << i << endl; 
        } 
 
        else 
        { 
            if ( i == 255 ) cout << "OK all lookups succeeded" << endl; 
        } 





    /*Walsh-Hadarman Transform Code from: www.ciphersbyritter.com*/ 
    int el1 = 0; 
    int el2 = 0; 
    int stradwid = 1; 
    int bitARLast = 255; 
    int blocks = 255; 
 
    while ( stradwid != 0 ) 
    { 
        el1 = 0; 
        blocks >>= 1; 
 
        for ( int block = 0; block <= blocks; block++ ) 
        { 
            el2 = el1 + stradwid; 
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            for ( int pair = 0; pair < stradwid; pair++ ) 
            { 
                int a = bits[ el1 ]; 
                int b = bits[ el2 ]; 
                bits[ el1 ] = a + b; 
                bits[ el2 ] = a - b; 
                el1++; 
                el2++; 
            } 
 
            el1 = el2; 
        } 
 
        stradwid = ( stradwid + stradwid ) & bitARLast; 
    } 
} 
 
void tests::testNonLinearity ( bool verbose ) 
{ 
    int minNL = 0; 
 
    for ( int i = 0;i < 8;i++ ) 
    { 
        for ( int j = 0;j < 256;j++ ) 
        { 
            bits[j] = ( sbox[j] & BIT ( i ) ) == 0 ? 0 : 1; 
        } 
 
        BitARFWT(); 
 
        for ( int i = 1;i < 256;i++ ) 
        { 
            if ( abs ( bits[i] ) > minNL ) minNL = abs ( bits[i] ); 
        } 
    } 
 
    minNL = 128 - minNL; 
 
    cout << "MinNL = " << dec << minNL << endl; 
} 
 
void tests::testDataHistogram ( bool verbose ) 
{ 
    char inFile[128]; 
    char outFile[128]; 
 
    do 
    { 
        cout << "Enter the data filename: " << endl; 
        cin.getline ( inFile, 128 ); 
    } 
 
    while ( cin.gcount() == 1 ); 
 
    do 
    { 
        cout << "Enter the results filename: " << endl; 
 115 
        cin.getline ( outFile, 128 ); 
    } 
 
    while ( cin.gcount() == 1 ); 
 
    uint64_t Histogram[256]; 
 
    for ( int i = 0;i < 256;i++ ) Histogram[i] = 0; 
 
    int n; 
 
    struct stat results; 
 
    n = stat ( inFile, &results ); 
 
    ifstream data ( inFile, ios::in | ios::binary ); 
 
    assert ( data ); 
 
    ofstream resultsFile ( outFile, ios::out ); 
 
    int c = 0; 
 
    for ( int i = 0;i < results.st_size;i++ ) 
    { 
        data.read ( ( char* ) &c, 1 ); 
        Histogram[c]++; 
    } 
 
    data.close(); 
 
    for ( int i = 0;i < 256;i++ ) 
    { 
        resultsFile << hex << i << "," << dec << Histogram[i] << endl; 
 
        if ( verbose ) cout << dec << Histogram[i] << "\t"; 
 
        if ( verbose ) if ( ( i + 1 ) % 16 == 0 ) cout << endl; 
    } 
 
    resultsFile << "Total Bytes: " << results.st_size << endl; 
 
    if ( verbose ) cout << "Total Bytes: " << results.st_size << endl; 
 
    resultsFile.close(); 
} 
 
void tests::testBitChanges ( bool verbose ) 
{ 
    unsigned int totalBitChanges = 0; 
    int count = 0; 
 
    for ( int i = 0;i < 256;i++ ) 
    { 
        count = 0; 
 
        for ( int j = 0;j < 8;j++ ) 
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        { 
            if ( ( i&BIT ( j ) ) != ( sbox[i]&BIT ( j ) ) ) count++; 
 
        } 
 
        totalBitChanges += count; 
 
        if ( verbose ) cout << "BitChange count for entry " << dec << i 
<< " = " << count << "/" << ( 8 ) << " = " << count / ( float ) 8 << 
endl; 
    } 
 
    cout << "AvgBitChanges = " << totalBitChanges << "/" << ( 256*8 ) 
<< " = " << totalBitChanges / ( float ) ( 256*8 ) << endl; 
} 
 
void tests::testAvalanche ( bool verbose ) 
{ 
    /*Tests the avalanche effect by counting bit changes for single bit 
changes in the input for all 256 entries*/ 
    unsigned int totalAvalanche = 0; 
    int count = 0; 
    int modified = 0; 
 
    for ( int i = 0;i < 256;i++ ) 
    { 
        count = 0; 
 
        for ( int j = 0;j < 8;j++ ) 
        { 
            modified = i ^ BIT ( j ); 
 
            for ( int k = 0;k < 8;k++ ) 
            { 
                if ( ( sbox[i]&BIT ( k ) ) != ( sbox[modified]&BIT ( k 
) ) ) count++; 
            } 
        } 
 
        if ( verbose ) cout << "Avalanche for " << i << " = " << count 
<< " / " << ( 8*8 ) << " = " << count / ( float ) ( 8*8 ) << endl; 
 
        totalAvalanche += count; 
    } 
 
    cout << "Overall Avalanche = " << totalAvalanche << " / " << ( 
















int main ( int argc, char *argv[] ) 
{ 
    srand ( time ( 0 ) ); //Initialize the random seed to the time 
 
    galois *newgalois = new galois(); //Create a blocking instance of 
galois 
 
    system ( "PAUSE" ); //Pause then exit 
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const uint8_t generators[128] = {                                    
0x03, 0x05, 0x06, 0x09, 0x0b, 0x0e, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x17, 0x18, 
0x19, 0x1a, 0x1c, 0x1e, 0x1f, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x27, 0x28, 0x2a, 0x2c, 
0x30, 0x31, 0x3c, 0x3e, 0x3f, 0x41, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48, 0x49, 0x4b, 
0x4c, 0x4e, 0x4f, 0x52, 0x54, 0x56, 0x57, 0x58, 0x59, 0x5a, 0x5b, 0x5f, 
0x64, 0x65, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x70, 0x71, 0x76, 0x77, 0x79, 0x7a, 
0x7b, 0x7e, 0x81, 0x84, 0x86, 0x87, 0x88, 0x8a, 0x8e, 0x8f, 0x90, 0x93, 
0x95, 0x96, 0x98, 0x99, 0x9b, 0x9d, 0xa0, 0xa4, 0xa5, 0xa6, 0xa7, 0xa9, 
0xaa, 0xac, 0xad, 0xb2, 0xb4, 0xb7, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xba, 0xbe, 0xbf, 0xc0, 
0xc1, 0xc4, 0xc8, 0xc9, 0xce, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xd6, 0xd7, 0xda, 0xdc, 0xdd, 
0xde, 0xe2, 0xe3, 0xe5, 0xe6, 0xe7, 0xe9, 0xea, 0xeb, 0xee, 0xf0, 0xf1, 
0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf8, 0xfb, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff 
                                }; 
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uint8_t ROTL(uint8_t x, uint8_t s) 
{ 
    return (uint8_t) (((x)<<(s&(8-1))) | ((x)>>(8-(s&(8-1))))); 
} 
 
uint8_t ROTR(uint8_t x, uint8_t s) 
{ 
    return (uint8_t) (((x)>>(s&(8-1))) | ((x)<<(8-(s&(8-1))))); 
} 
 
uint8_t gadd(uint8_t a, uint8_t b) 
{ 
    return a ^ b; 
} 
uint8_t gsub(uint8_t a, uint8_t b) 
{ 
    return a ^ b; 
} 
 
uint8_t gmul(uint8_t a, uint8_t b) 
{ 
    uint8_t p = 0; 
    uint8_t counter; 
    uint8_t hi_bit_set; 
    for (counter = 0; counter < 8; counter++) 
    { 
        if ((b & 1) == 1) 
            p ^= a; 
        hi_bit_set = (a & 0x80); 
        a <<= 1; 
        if (hi_bit_set == 0x80) 
            a ^= 0x1b; 
        b >>= 1; 
    } 
    return p; 
} 
 
void generateTables(uint8_t seed) 
{ 
    etable[0] = 1; 
    etable[255] = 1; 
    for (int c=1;c<256;c++) 
    { 
        etable[c] = gmul(etable[c-1],seed); 
        ltable[etable[c]] = c; 
    } 
    etable[255] = 1; 
} 
 
uint8_t gmulLookup(uint8_t a, uint8_t b) 
{ 
    int s; 
    int q; 
    int z = 0; 
    s = ltable[a] + ltable[b]; 
    s %= 255; 
    s = etable[s]; 
 120 
    q = s; 
    if (a == 0) 
    { 
        s = z; 
    } 
    else 
    { 
        s = q; 
    } 
    if (b == 0) 
    { 
        s = z; 
    } 
    else 
    { 
        q = z; 
    } 
    return s; 
} 
 
uint8_t gmulInverse(uint8_t in) 
{ 
    if (in == 0) 
        return 0; 
    else 





    gmulInv[0] = 0; 
    for (int c=1;c<256;c++) 
    { 
        gmulInv[c] = gmulInverse(c); 
    } 
} 
 
uint8_t sub(uint8_t in) 
{ 
    uint8_t c, s, x; 
    s = x = gmulInv[in]; 
    for (c = 0; c < 4; c++) 
    { 
        s = (s << 1) | (s >> 7); 
        x ^= s; 
    } 
    x ^= seed; 





    for (int c=0;c<256;c++) 
    { 
        SBox[c] = sub(c); 
        SBoxInv[SBox[c]] = c; 






    cout << "Log Table" << endl; 
    for (int i=0;i<256;i++) 
    { 
        cout << hex << (uint16_t) ltable[i] << "\t"; 
        if ((i+1)%16 == 0) cout << endl; 
    } 
 
    cout << endl << endl << endl; 
 
    cout << "Anti-Log Table" << endl; 
    for (int i=0;i<256;i++) 
    { 
        cout << hex << (uint16_t) etable[i] << "\t"; 
        if ((i+1)%16 == 0) cout << endl; 
    } 
 
    cout << endl << endl << endl; 
 
    cout << "GMul Inverse Table" << endl; 
    for (int i=0;i<256;i++) 
    { 
        cout << hex << (uint16_t) gmulInv[i] << "\t"; 
        if ((i+1)%16 == 0) cout << endl; 
    } 
 
    cout << endl << endl << endl; 
 
    cout << "SBox Table" << endl; 
    for (int i=0;i<256;i++) 
    { 
        cout << hex << (uint16_t) SBox[i] << "\t"; 
        if ((i+1)%16 == 0) cout << endl; 
    } 
 
    cout << endl << endl << endl; 
 
    cout << "Inverse SBox Table" << endl; 
    for (int i=0;i<256;i++) 
    { 
        cout << hex << (uint16_t) SBoxInv[i] << "\t"; 
        if ((i+1)%16 == 0) cout << endl; 
    } 
 
    cout << endl << endl << endl; 
 
    cout << "Key Table" << endl; 
    for (int i=0;i<240;i++) 
    { 
        cout << hex << (uint16_t) expandKey[i] << "\t"; 
        if ((i+1)%16 == 0) cout << endl; 






    for (int i=0;i<256;i++) 
    { 
        ltable[i] = etable[i] = gmulInv[i] = SBox[i] = SBoxInv[i] = 0; 





    for (int i = 0; i < 256; i++) 
    { 
        if (SBoxInv[SBox[i]] != i) 
        { 
            cout << "Wrong value at " << i; 
 
        } 
        else 
        { 
            if (i == 255) cout << "OK all lookups succeeded" << endl; 
        } 
    } 
} 
 
void gmixColumn(uint8_t *r) 
{ 
    uint8_t a[4]; 
    uint8_t c; 
    for (c=0;c<4;c++) 
    { 
        a[c] = r[c]; 
    } 
    r[0] = gmul(a[0],2) ^ gmul(a[3],1) ^ gmul(a[2],1) ^ gmul(a[1],3); 
    r[1] = gmul(a[1],2) ^ gmul(a[0],1) ^ gmul(a[3],1) ^ gmul(a[2],3); 
    r[2] = gmul(a[2],2) ^ gmul(a[1],1) ^ gmul(a[0],1) ^ gmul(a[3],3); 
    r[3] = gmul(a[3],2) ^ gmul(a[2],1) ^ gmul(a[1],1) ^ gmul(a[0],3); 
} 
 
void invGmixColumn(uint8_t *r) 
{ 
    uint8_t a[4]; 
    uint8_t c; 
    for (c=0;c<4;c++) 
    { 
        a[c] = r[c]; 
    } 
 
    r[0] = gmul(a[0],14) ^ gmul(a[3],9) ^ gmul(a[2],13) ^ 
gmul(a[1],11); 
    r[1] = gmul(a[1],14) ^ gmul(a[0],9) ^ gmul(a[3],13) ^ 
gmul(a[2],11); 
    r[2] = gmul(a[2],14) ^ gmul(a[1],9) ^ gmul(a[0],13) ^ 
gmul(a[3],11); 





void rotate(uint8_t *in) 
{ 
    uint8_t a,c; 
    a = in[0]; 
    for (c=0;c<3;c++) in[c] = in[c + 1]; 
    in[3] = a; 
    return; 
} 
 
uint8_t rcon(uint8_t in) 
{ 
    uint8_t c=1; 
    if (in == 0) return 0; 
    while (in != 1) 
    { 
        c = gmul(c,2); 
        in--; 
    } 
    return c; 
} 
 
void schedule_core(uint8_t *in, uint8_t i) 
{ 
    char a; 
    rotate(in); 
    for (int a = 0; a < 4; a++) 
        in[a] = SBox[in[a]]; 
    in[0] ^= rcon(i); 
} 
 
void expand_key(uint8_t *in) 
{ 
    uint8_t t[4]; 
    uint8_t c = 32; 
    uint8_t a; 
    uint8_t i = 1; 
    while (c < 240) 
    { 
        for (a = 0; a < 4; a++) t[a] = in[a + c - 4]; 
        if (c % 32 == 0) 
        { 
            schedule_core(t,i); 
            i++; 
        } 
 
        if (c % 32 == 16) 
        { 
            for (a = 0; a < 4; a++) t[a] = SBox[t[a]]; 
        } 
        for (a = 0; a < 4; a++) 
        { 
            in[c] = in[c - 32] ^ t[a]; 
            c++; 
        } 






    for (int i=0;i<240;i++) 
    { 
        cout << "i=" << i << " " << hex << (uint16_t) expandKey[i] << 
endl; 





    uint8_t test[] = { 0xdb, 0x13, 0x53, 0x45 }; 
 
    for (int i=0;i<32;i++) expandKey[i] = 0xff; 
 
    //Verify Generator Tables 
    //verifyExe(); 
    for (int i= 0;i<128;i++) 
    { 
        seed = generators[i]; 
        cout << "Generator = " << hex << (uint16_t) generators[i] << 
endl; 
        //Zero tables for a new galois genertor 
        resetTables(); 
        //Generate Log/Exponentiation Tables 
        generateTables(generators[i]); 
        //Generate 1/x Tables 
        generateGmulInverse(); 
        //Generate SBox based on galois generator. 
        generateSBoxen(); 
        //Check SBox to SBoxInv 
        checkInvertibility(); 
        //Check GMix 
        //gmixColumn(test); 
        //for(int i=0;i<4;i++) cout << hex << (uint16_t) test[i] << " 
"; 
        //Check InvGMix 
        //invGmixColumn(test); 
        //for(int i=0;i<4;i++) cout << hex << (uint16_t) test[i] << " 
"; 
        expand_key(expandKey); 
        //printTables(); 
        cout << "Generator " << i << ": " << endl; 
        system("pause"); 
    } 
    //system("pause"); 
 
    return 0; 
} 
 





#define HEIGHT 32 
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    for (int i=0;i<HEIGHT;i++) 
    { 
        for (int j=0;j<WIDTH;j++) 
        { 
            printf("Left side for i = %d = %d\n", i, (HEIGHT + (i-
1))%HEIGHT); 
            printf("Right side for i = %d = %d\n", i, (HEIGHT + 
(i+1))%HEIGHT); 
            printf("Bottom side for i = %d = %d\n", j, (WIDTH + (j-
1))%WIDTH); 
            printf("Top side for i = %d = %d\n", j, (WIDTH + 
(j+1))%WIDTH); 
        } 
        system("pause"); 
    } 
    return 0; 
} 
 









int test[256] = 
    {0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 
0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76, 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 
0xf0, 0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0, 0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 
0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc, 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 
0x15, 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 
0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75, 0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 
0xa0, 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84, 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 
0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b, 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 
0xcf, 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85, 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 
0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8, 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 
0xf5, 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2, 0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 
0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 
0x73, 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 
0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 
0x5c, 0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79, 0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 
0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 
0x08, 0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 
0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a, 0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 
0x0e, 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e, 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 
0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94, 0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 
0xdf, 0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 









    int el1 = 0; 
    int el2 = 0; 
    int stradwid = 1; 
    int bitARLast = 255; 
    int blocks = 255; 
 
    while (stradwid != 0) 
    { 
        el1 = 0; 
        blocks >>= 1; 
        for (int block=0; block <= blocks; block++) 
        { 
            el2 = el1 + stradwid; 
            for (int pair=0; pair < stradwid; pair++) 
            { 
                int a = bits[ el1 ]; 
                int b = bits[ el2 ]; 
                bits[ el1 ] = a + b; 
                bits[ el2 ] = a - b; 
                el1++; 
                el2++; 
            } 
            el1 = el2; 
        } 
        stradwid = (stradwid + stradwid) & bitARLast; 





    long unsigned int avgNL=0; 
    int minNL = 0; 
    int maxNL = 256; 
 
    for (int i=0;i<8;i++) 
    { 
        for (int j=0;j<256;j++) 
        { 
            bits[j] = (test[j]&BIT(i))==0?0:1; 
        } 
        BitARFWT(); 
        for (int i=1;i<256;i++) 
        { 
            if (abs(bits[i]) > minNL) minNL = abs(bits[i]); 
            if (abs(bits[i]) < maxNL) maxNL = abs(bits[i]); 
            avgNL += 128 - abs(bits[i]); 
        } 
    } 
 
    avgNL /= (255*8); 
    minNL = 128 - minNL; 
    maxNL = 128 - maxNL; 
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    cout << "AvgNL = " << avgNL << endl; 
    cout << "MinNL = " << minNL << endl; 






    getNonLinearity(); 
 
    system("pause"); 
    return 0; 
} 
 





using namespace std; 
 
 
void rotate(uint8_t *in) 
{ 
    uint8_t a,c; 
    a = in[0]; 
    for (c=0;c<7;c++) in[c] = in[c + 1]; 
    in[7] = a; 
    return; 
} 
 
void shiftRows(uint8_t in[4][8]) 
{ 
    for (int i=1;i<4;i++) 
    { 
        for (int j=0;j<i;j++) rotate(in[i]); 
    } 
} 
 
void unshiftRows(uint8_t in[4][8]) 
{ 
    for (int i=1;i<4;i++) 
    { 
        for (int j=4-i;j>0;j--) rotate(in[i]); 
    } 
} 
 
void printOut(uint8_t in[4][8]) 
{ 
    for (int i=0;i<4;i++) 
    { 
        for (int j=0;j<8;j++) 
        { 
            if(in[i][j]<16)cout << "0"; 
            else cout << ""; cout << hex << (uint16_t) in[i][j] << " "; 
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        } 
        cout << endl; 
    } 





    for (int i=1;i<4;i++) 
    { 
        for (int j=0;j<i;j++) cout << "Shifting " << i << endl; 
    } 
 
    for (int i=1;i<4;i++) 
    { 
        for (int j=4-i;j>0;j--) cout << "UnShifting " << i << endl; 
    } 
 





    printOut(blah); 
    shiftRows(blah); 
    printOut(blah); 
    unshiftRows(blah); 
    printOut(blah); 
 
    system("pause"); 
    return 0; 
} 
 






using namespace std; 
 
uint8_t gmul(uint8_t a, uint8_t b) 
{ 
    uint8_t p = 0; 
    uint8_t counter; 
    uint8_t hi_bit_set; 
    for (counter = 0; counter < 8; counter++) 
    { 
        if ((b & 1) == 1) 
            p ^= a; 
        hi_bit_set = (a & 0x80); 
        a <<= 1; 
        if (hi_bit_set == 0x80) 
            a ^= 0x1b; 
        b >>= 1; 
    } 
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    return p; 
} 
 
void gmixColumn(uint8_t *r) 
{ 
    uint8_t a[4]; 
    uint8_t c; 
    for (c=0;c<4;c++) 
    { 
        a[c] = r[c]; 
    } 
    r[0] = gmul(a[0],2) ^ gmul(a[3],1) ^ gmul(a[2],1) ^ gmul(a[1],3); 
    r[1] = gmul(a[1],2) ^ gmul(a[0],1) ^ gmul(a[3],1) ^ gmul(a[2],3); 
    r[2] = gmul(a[2],2) ^ gmul(a[1],1) ^ gmul(a[0],1) ^ gmul(a[3],3); 
    r[3] = gmul(a[3],2) ^ gmul(a[2],1) ^ gmul(a[1],1) ^ gmul(a[0],3); 
} 
 
void invGmixColumn(uint8_t *r) 
{ 
    uint8_t a[4]; 
    uint8_t c; 
    for (c=0;c<4;c++) 
    { 
        a[c] = r[c]; 
    } 
 
    r[0] = gmul(a[0],14) ^ gmul(a[3],9) ^ gmul(a[2],13) ^ 
gmul(a[1],11); 
    r[1] = gmul(a[1],14) ^ gmul(a[0],9) ^ gmul(a[3],13) ^ 
gmul(a[2],11); 
    r[2] = gmul(a[2],14) ^ gmul(a[1],9) ^ gmul(a[0],13) ^ 
gmul(a[3],11); 




void mixColumns(uint8_t in[4][8]) 
{ 
    uint8_t temp[4]; 
    for (int j=0;j<8;j++) 
    { 
        for (int i=0;i<4;i++) 
        { 
            temp[i] = in[i][j]; 
        } 
        gmixColumn(temp); 
        for (int i=0;i<4;i++) 
        { 
            in[i][j] = temp[i]; 
        } 
    } 
} 
 
void unmixColumns(uint8_t in[4][8]) 
{ 
    uint8_t temp[4]; 
    for (int j=0;j<8;j++) 
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    { 
        for (int i=0;i<4;i++) 
        { 
            temp[i] = in[i][j]; 
        } 
        invGmixColumn(temp); 
        for (int i=0;i<4;i++) 
        { 
            in[i][j] = temp[i]; 
        } 
    } 
} 
 
void printOut(uint8_t in[4][8]) 
{ 
    for (int i=0;i<4;i++) 
    { 
        for (int j=0;j<8;j++) 
        { 
            if(in[i][j]<16)cout << "0"; 
            else cout << ""; cout << hex << (uint16_t) in[i][j] << " "; 
        } 
        cout << endl; 
    } 









    printOut(blah); 
    mixColumns(blah); 
    printOut(blah); 
    unmixColumns(blah); 
    printOut(blah); 
    system("pause"); 
    return 0; 
} 
 













    uint8_t data[256*64]; 
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    clock_t start_tick; 
    for (int x=0;x<256*64;x++) 
    { 
        data[x] = 0; 
        start_tick = clock(); 
        while (clock() == start_tick) 
        { 
            data[x]++; 
        } 
    } 
 
    for(int i=0;i<256*64;i++) 
    { 
        cout << i << "\t" << hex << (uint16_t) data[i] << endl; 
    } 
 
    uint8_t hist[256]; 
    for(int i=0;i<256;i++) 
    { 
        hist[i] = 0; 
    } 
 
    for(int i=0;i<256*64;i++) 
    { 
        hist[data[i]]++; 
    } 
 
    cout << endl << endl; 
 
    for(int i=0;i<256;i++) 
    { 
        cout << dec << i << "," << dec << (uint16_t) hist[i] << endl; 
    } 
 
    system("pause"); 
    return 0; 
} 
 








echo -n "A" >> text.txt; 
./a.out < runScriptEncrypt > /dev/null; 
./a.out < runScriptDecrypt > /dev/null; 






























-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:31 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  1 2007-06-02 16:31 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  1 2007-06-02 16:31 text.txt 
4b5bc888e08b7c3241dfa18564749292  ciph.txt 
7fc56270e7a70fa81a5935b72eacbe29  newtext.txt 
7fc56270e7a70fa81a5935b72eacbe29  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:31 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  2 2007-06-02 16:31 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  2 2007-06-02 16:31 text.txt 
50fbadc7a5abc1f82b198b1f22a2599e  ciph.txt 
3b98e2dffc6cb06a89dcb0d5c60a0206  newtext.txt 
3b98e2dffc6cb06a89dcb0d5c60a0206  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:31 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  3 2007-06-02 16:31 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  3 2007-06-02 16:31 text.txt 
c62414a5cc9167f261d249176974335a  ciph.txt 
e1faffb3e614e6c2fba74296962386b7  newtext.txt 
e1faffb3e614e6c2fba74296962386b7  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:31 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  4 2007-06-02 16:31 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  4 2007-06-02 16:31 text.txt 
9467faad9af733e43226ad85b75ca9e8  ciph.txt 
098890dde069e9abad63f19a0d9e1f32  newtext.txt 
098890dde069e9abad63f19a0d9e1f32  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:31 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  5 2007-06-02 16:31 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  5 2007-06-02 16:31 text.txt 
7d30a0a505fb38f58e4468665c9bd7b6  ciph.txt 
f6a6263167c92de8644ac998b3c4e4d1  newtext.txt 
f6a6263167c92de8644ac998b3c4e4d1  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:31 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  6 2007-06-02 16:31 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  6 2007-06-02 16:31 text.txt 
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374c4693420730ef3d655bf377d7681d  ciph.txt 
36d04a9d74392c727b1a9bf97a7bcbac  newtext.txt 
36d04a9d74392c727b1a9bf97a7bcbac  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:31 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  7 2007-06-02 16:31 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  7 2007-06-02 16:31 text.txt 
a781ab5862c1d70b272e46e2148777e3  ciph.txt 
8430894cfeb54a3625f18fe24fce272e  newtext.txt 
8430894cfeb54a3625f18fe24fce272e  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:31 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  8 2007-06-02 16:31 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  8 2007-06-02 16:31 text.txt 
081b3a9ba33e7e278b3b4b7c05cc4a7f  ciph.txt 
aee9e38cb4d40ec2794542567539b4c8  newtext.txt 
aee9e38cb4d40ec2794542567539b4c8  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:31 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  9 2007-06-02 16:31 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  9 2007-06-02 16:31 text.txt 
f3f5f53f5d9767fac37c52ab5ac4e3c3  ciph.txt 
6c9395cacd317eed2777f669103b7181  newtext.txt 
6c9395cacd317eed2777f669103b7181  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:31 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 10 2007-06-02 16:31 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 10 2007-06-02 16:31 text.txt 
8545b583d6ed814fe263d8b08469d576  ciph.txt 
16c52c6e8326c071da771e66dc6e9e57  newtext.txt 
16c52c6e8326c071da771e66dc6e9e57  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:31 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 11 2007-06-02 16:31 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 11 2007-06-02 16:31 text.txt 
8d9ea3b18f34da611ba25bca01eea1d2  ciph.txt 
aae9ed2aebd46960a986cfb376bc1eca  newtext.txt 
aae9ed2aebd46960a986cfb376bc1eca  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:31 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 12 2007-06-02 16:31 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 12 2007-06-02 16:31 text.txt 
568348987f6d18af058f6767a7ee8243  ciph.txt 
02737e4e8c87d7466b623c1f844fdd71  newtext.txt 
02737e4e8c87d7466b623c1f844fdd71  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:31 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 13 2007-06-02 16:31 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 13 2007-06-02 16:31 text.txt 
c1ba67d0dff94d5ce0d1cd911fbbd254  ciph.txt 
a68c7b41f873e90566acec7c22f89824  newtext.txt 
a68c7b41f873e90566acec7c22f89824  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:31 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 14 2007-06-02 16:31 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 14 2007-06-02 16:31 text.txt 
ee563345e901b0d0862b548b2e51b4f7  ciph.txt 
74d8c66251bba513d7d317dd47f556ba  newtext.txt 
74d8c66251bba513d7d317dd47f556ba  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:31 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 15 2007-06-02 16:31 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 15 2007-06-02 16:31 text.txt 
a47d0f1fc70e3fcde7a7c1ab86151a12  ciph.txt 
409c94b762769ea5fb9384eb9bddf207  newtext.txt 
409c94b762769ea5fb9384eb9bddf207  text.txt 
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-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:31 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 16 2007-06-02 16:31 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 16 2007-06-02 16:31 text.txt 
87dd2d7909afdafc67a3462d69c53d79  ciph.txt 
d8a73157ce10cd94a91c2079fc9a92c8  newtext.txt 
d8a73157ce10cd94a91c2079fc9a92c8  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:31 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 17 2007-06-02 16:31 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 17 2007-06-02 16:31 text.txt 
f95074577aa85825d8f38b135c8164c3  ciph.txt 
1105d53d33874fe294a18ee36398f2dc  newtext.txt 
1105d53d33874fe294a18ee36398f2dc  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:31 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 18 2007-06-02 16:31 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 18 2007-06-02 16:31 text.txt 
665a94ca1a36b8f011fd2854ab8e5f36  ciph.txt 
9fe125b6680b43a62953d4cc6f4e08bf  newtext.txt 
9fe125b6680b43a62953d4cc6f4e08bf  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:31 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 19 2007-06-02 16:31 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 19 2007-06-02 16:31 text.txt 
0338ac039e3964b786829497914775d8  ciph.txt 
7ae4d6728e33ff002bf67a2e5194ccb1  newtext.txt 
7ae4d6728e33ff002bf67a2e5194ccb1  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:31 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 20 2007-06-02 16:31 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 20 2007-06-02 16:31 text.txt 
ac3269e385c3d02ca3e94daac9f2d199  ciph.txt 
76d36e98f312e98ff908c8c82c8dd623  newtext.txt 
76d36e98f312e98ff908c8c82c8dd623  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:31 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 21 2007-06-02 16:31 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 21 2007-06-02 16:31 text.txt 
825cd1e108204ae124920b635f0f0d88  ciph.txt 
59f34ff3997b416f4f2dee1c9776c0cd  newtext.txt 
59f34ff3997b416f4f2dee1c9776c0cd  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:31 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 22 2007-06-02 16:31 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 22 2007-06-02 16:31 text.txt 
b8222f08a01c2a4e9260c53ee65ad3f0  ciph.txt 
8b4cc90d421780e7674e2a25db33b770  newtext.txt 
8b4cc90d421780e7674e2a25db33b770  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:31 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 23 2007-06-02 16:31 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 23 2007-06-02 16:31 text.txt 
d8abd5eab8bdbb5b3ce87c1b0855cc06  ciph.txt 
38079371e04ce549db3e4d69bc96b3ad  newtext.txt 
38079371e04ce549db3e4d69bc96b3ad  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:32 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 24 2007-06-02 16:32 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 24 2007-06-02 16:31 text.txt 
ab390cdb9460daf3d58f6fda3b8484d4  ciph.txt 
c7c6abfa9cb508f7fc178d4045313a94  newtext.txt 
c7c6abfa9cb508f7fc178d4045313a94  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:32 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 25 2007-06-02 16:32 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 25 2007-06-02 16:32 text.txt 
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13194c6874dab92645c98b199f6d6a54  ciph.txt 
1995da96cd16a48cebcbc08424f6f945  newtext.txt 
1995da96cd16a48cebcbc08424f6f945  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:32 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 26 2007-06-02 16:32 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 26 2007-06-02 16:32 text.txt 
7224b7e5c0724b78f6edfff1b4c39ec1  ciph.txt 
9894d0235313057edec272848ca193f3  newtext.txt 
9894d0235313057edec272848ca193f3  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:32 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 27 2007-06-02 16:32 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 27 2007-06-02 16:32 text.txt 
c27e387e6794c203d40422b1375e7776  ciph.txt 
878d9f8dea73b35e1d23570409b0a09d  newtext.txt 
878d9f8dea73b35e1d23570409b0a09d  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:32 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 28 2007-06-02 16:32 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 28 2007-06-02 16:32 text.txt 
7b311aa89bf0a03bbea37ea1d900b305  ciph.txt 
35ea99843da5ff0639992be381c5b77a  newtext.txt 
35ea99843da5ff0639992be381c5b77a  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:32 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 29 2007-06-02 16:32 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 29 2007-06-02 16:32 text.txt 
3a4e3504c796e29c3630e2222f9b8fc5  ciph.txt 
cf5205dc20fb05145e6d1fa08166e94e  newtext.txt 
cf5205dc20fb05145e6d1fa08166e94e  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:32 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 30 2007-06-02 16:32 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 30 2007-06-02 16:32 text.txt 
182d0f7f9e69f23e3839600117ea2fb1  ciph.txt 
a8a7d9c5e31058f15d25f18d7d65404a  newtext.txt 
a8a7d9c5e31058f15d25f18d7d65404a  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:32 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 31 2007-06-02 16:32 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 31 2007-06-02 16:32 text.txt 
a1ab7389ad453f36e69bc79d4a65e26d  ciph.txt 
d09170db213e1a1fdc5effd49fd34767  newtext.txt 
d09170db213e1a1fdc5effd49fd34767  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 96 2007-06-02 16:32 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 32 2007-06-02 16:32 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 32 2007-06-02 16:32 text.txt 
b5ccb9536c4b08f2a58eb4b75ce31125  ciph.txt 
5216ddcc58e8dade5256075e77f642da  newtext.txt 
5216ddcc58e8dade5256075e77f642da  text.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 128 2007-06-02 16:32 ciph.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  33 2007-06-02 16:32 newtext.txt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  33 2007-06-02 16:32 text.txt 
3d6c9595b8402b350aab89ac8c09d18e  ciph.txt 
eeda92ae5deb94f83a420113abf8db3e  newtext.txt 
eeda92ae5deb94f83a420113abf8db3e  text.txt 
 
C8.  Time Analysis and Profiling Results 
 
Generator Tables Verified! Check: 54 Compare: 54 
Encrypt or Decrypt? (e,d)  
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Would you like to enter a 1)Passphrase or 2)Key?  
***Input 32 Ascii Characters**** 
***TextFile Name: <=32 Chars**** 
***CiphFile Name: <=32 Chars**** 
Enter your galois generator number (0-127) 
Enter the number of generations per block:  
Enter the number of key generations per block:  
Enter the threshold value for the Automata: (64-192) (127 RECOMMENDED)  






Each sample counts as 0.01 seconds. 
  %   cumulative   self              self     total            
 time   seconds   seconds    calls   s/call   s/call  name     
 57.76     21.76    21.76 13631800     0.00     0.00  
galois::gmixColumn(unsigned char*) 
 18.04     28.55     6.80  6071822     0.00     0.00  
margolis::swap(int, int, int, int) 
 14.58     34.05     5.49   262146     0.00     0.00  
margolis::doGenerations(int) 
  8.95     37.42     3.37   131075     0.00     0.00  
galois::doRounds() 
  0.24     37.51     0.09        1     0.09    37.57  galois::encrypt() 
  0.16     37.57     0.06        1     0.06     0.06  galois::initIV() 
  0.15     37.62     0.06                             
margolisSingle::swap(int, int, int, int) 
  0.15     37.68     0.06                             
galois::generateSBoxes() 
  0.00     37.68     0.00        4     0.00     0.00  void 
std::fill<char*, int>(char*, char*, int const&) 
  0.00     37.68     0.00        2     0.00     0.00  
std::hex(std::ios_base&) 
  0.00     37.68     0.00        1     0.00     0.00  global 
constructors keyed to _ZN8margolis10setupRulesEv 
  0.00     37.68     0.00        1     0.00     0.00  
galois::expand_key() 
  0.00     37.68     0.00        1     0.00     0.00  
galois::initCipher() 
  0.00     37.68     0.00        1     0.00     0.00  
galois::textUserPrompt() 
  0.00     37.68     0.00        1     0.00    37.57  
galois::doEncryptDecrypt() 
  0.00     37.68     0.00        1     0.00     0.00  
galois::verifyGenerators() 
  0.00     37.68     0.00        1     0.00     0.00  
margolis::setParams(unsigned char*, unsigned char*, int, int, int) 
  0.00     37.68     0.00        1     0.00     0.00  
std::dec(std::ios_base&) 
 
granularity: each sample hit covers 2 byte(s) for 0.03% of 37.68 
seconds 
 
index % time    self  children    called     name 
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                0.09   37.48       1/1           
galois::doEncryptDecrypt() [3] 
[1]     99.7    0.09   37.48       1         galois::encrypt() [1] 
                3.37   21.76  131073/131075      galois::doRounds() [4] 
                5.49    6.80  262146/262146      
margolis::doGenerations(int) [6] 
                0.06    0.00       1/1           galois::initIV() [8] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                                                 <spontaneous> 
[2]     99.7    0.00   37.57                 main [2] 
                0.00   37.57       1/1           
galois::doEncryptDecrypt() [3] 
                0.00    0.00       1/1           
galois::verifyGenerators() [23] 
                0.00    0.00       1/1           
galois::textUserPrompt() [22] 
                0.00    0.00       1/1           galois::initCipher() 
[21] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                0.00   37.57       1/1           main [2] 
[3]     99.7    0.00   37.57       1         galois::doEncryptDecrypt() 
[3] 
                0.09   37.48       1/1           galois::encrypt() [1] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                0.00    0.00       2/131075      galois::initIV() [8] 
                3.37   21.76  131073/131075      galois::encrypt() [1] 
[4]     66.7    3.37   21.76  131075         galois::doRounds() [4] 
               21.76    0.00 13631800/13631800     
galois::gmixColumn(unsigned char*) [5] 
----------------------------------------------- 
               21.76    0.00 13631800/13631800     galois::doRounds() 
[4] 
[5]     57.8   21.76    0.00 13631800         
galois::gmixColumn(unsigned char*) [5] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                5.49    6.80  262146/262146      galois::encrypt() [1] 
[6]     32.6    5.49    6.80  262146         
margolis::doGenerations(int) [6] 
                6.80    0.00 6071822/6071822     margolis::swap(int, 
int, int, int) [7] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                6.80    0.00 6071822/6071822     
margolis::doGenerations(int) [6] 
[7]     18.0    6.80    0.00 6071822         margolis::swap(int, int, 
int, int) [7] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                0.06    0.00       1/1           galois::encrypt() [1] 
[8]      0.2    0.06    0.00       1         galois::initIV() [8] 
                0.00    0.00       2/131075      galois::doRounds() [4] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                                                 <spontaneous> 
[9]      0.1    0.06    0.00                 margolisSingle::swap(int, 
int, int, int) [9] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                                                 <spontaneous> 




                0.00    0.00       4/4           
galois::textUserPrompt() [22] 
[17]     0.0    0.00    0.00       4         void std::fill<char*, 
int>(char*, char*, int const&) [17] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                0.00    0.00       2/2           
galois::verifyGenerators() [23] 
[18]     0.0    0.00    0.00       2         std::hex(std::ios_base&) 
[18] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                0.00    0.00       1/1           __do_global_ctors_aux 
[80] 
[19]     0.0    0.00    0.00       1         global constructors keyed 
to _ZN8margolis10setupRulesEv [19] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                0.00    0.00       1/1           galois::initCipher() 
[21] 
[20]     0.0    0.00    0.00       1         galois::expand_key() [20] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                0.00    0.00       1/1           main [2] 
[21]     0.0    0.00    0.00       1         galois::initCipher() [21] 
                0.00    0.00       1/1           
margolis::setParams(unsigned char*, unsigned char*, int, int, int) [24] 
                0.00    0.00       1/1           galois::expand_key() 
[20] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                0.00    0.00       1/1           main [2] 
[22]     0.0    0.00    0.00       1         galois::textUserPrompt() 
[22] 
                0.00    0.00       4/4           void std::fill<char*, 
int>(char*, char*, int const&) [17] 
                0.00    0.00       1/1           
std::dec(std::ios_base&) [25] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                0.00    0.00       1/1           main [2] 
[23]     0.0    0.00    0.00       1         galois::verifyGenerators() 
[23] 
                0.00    0.00       2/2           
std::hex(std::ios_base&) [18] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                0.00    0.00       1/1           galois::initCipher() 
[21] 
[24]     0.0    0.00    0.00       1         
margolis::setParams(unsigned char*, unsigned char*, int, int, int) [24] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                0.00    0.00       1/1           
galois::textUserPrompt() [22] 




Index by function name 
 
  [19] global constructors keyed to _ZN8margolis10setupRulesEv [22] 
galois::textUserPrompt() [6] margolis::doGenerations(int) 
 139 
   [9] margolisSingle::swap(int, int, int, int) [3] 
galois::doEncryptDecrypt() [7] margolis::swap(int, int, int, int) 
  [20] galois::expand_key()   [23] galois::verifyGenerators() [24] 
margolis::setParams(unsigned char*, unsigned char*, int, int, int) 
   [5] galois::gmixColumn(unsigned char*) [8] galois::initIV() [25] 
std::dec(std::ios_base&) 
  [21] galois::initCipher()    [1] galois::encrypt()      [18] 
std::hex(std::ios_base&) 
  [10] galois::generateSBoxes() [4] galois::doRounds()    [17] void 
std::fill<char*, int>(char*, char*, int const&) 
Generator Tables Verified! Check: 54 Compare: 54 
Encrypt or Decrypt? (e,d)  
Would you like to enter a 1)Passphrase or 2)Key?  
***Input 32 Ascii Characters**** 
***TextFile Name: <=32 Chars**** 
***CiphFile Name: <=32 Chars**** 
Enter your galois generator number (0-127) 
Enter the number of generations per block:  
Enter the number of key generations per block:  
Enter the threshold value for the Automata: (64-192) (127 RECOMMENDED)  





Each sample counts as 0.01 seconds. 
  %   cumulative   self              self     total            
 time   seconds   seconds    calls   s/call   s/call  name     
 57.64     21.71    21.71 13631592     0.00     0.00  
galois::invGmixColumn(unsigned char*) 
 18.51     28.68     6.97  6071776     0.00     0.00  
margolis::swap(int, int, int, int) 
 14.39     34.10     5.42   262144     0.00     0.00  
margolis::doGenerations(int) 
  9.07     37.52     3.42   131073     0.00     0.00  
galois::doInvRounds() 
  0.17     37.58     0.07                             
galois::mixColumns() 
  0.16     37.64     0.06        1     0.06    37.58  galois::decrypt() 
  0.05     37.66     0.02                             
margolisSingle::swap(int, int, int, int) 
  0.01     37.67     0.01                             
galois::invShiftRows() 
  0.00     37.67     0.00        4     0.00     0.00  void 
std::fill<char*, int>(char*, char*, int const&) 
  0.00     37.67     0.00        2     0.00     0.00  
std::hex(std::ios_base&) 
  0.00     37.67     0.00        1     0.00     0.00  global 
constructors keyed to _ZN8margolis10setupRulesEv 
  0.00     37.67     0.00        1     0.00     0.00  
galois::expand_key() 
  0.00     37.67     0.00        1     0.00     0.00  
galois::initCipher() 
  0.00     37.67     0.00        1     0.00     0.00  
galois::textUserPrompt() 
  0.00     37.67     0.00        1     0.00    37.58  
galois::doEncryptDecrypt() 
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  0.00     37.67     0.00        1     0.00     0.00  
galois::verifyGenerators() 
  0.00     37.67     0.00        1     0.00     0.00  
margolis::setParams(unsigned char*, unsigned char*, int, int, int) 
  0.00     37.67     0.00        1     0.00     0.00  
std::dec(std::ios_base&) 
 
granularity: each sample hit covers 2 byte(s) for 0.03% of 37.67 
seconds 
 
index % time    self  children    called     name 
                                                 <spontaneous> 
[1]     99.8    0.00   37.58                 main [1] 
                0.00   37.58       1/1           
galois::doEncryptDecrypt() [2] 
                0.00    0.00       1/1           
galois::verifyGenerators() [23] 
                0.00    0.00       1/1           
galois::textUserPrompt() [22] 
                0.00    0.00       1/1           galois::initCipher() 
[21] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                0.00   37.58       1/1           main [1] 
[2]     99.8    0.00   37.58       1         galois::doEncryptDecrypt() 
[2] 
                0.06   37.52       1/1           galois::decrypt() [3] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                0.06   37.52       1/1           
galois::doEncryptDecrypt() [2] 
[3]     99.8    0.06   37.52       1         galois::decrypt() [3] 
                3.42   21.71  131073/131073      galois::doInvRounds() 
[4] 
                5.42    6.97  262144/262144      
margolis::doGenerations(int) [6] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                3.42   21.71  131073/131073      galois::decrypt() [3] 
[4]     66.7    3.42   21.71  131073         galois::doInvRounds() [4] 
               21.71    0.00 13631592/13631592     
galois::invGmixColumn(unsigned char*) [5] 
----------------------------------------------- 
               21.71    0.00 13631592/13631592     
galois::doInvRounds() [4] 
[5]     57.6   21.71    0.00 13631592         
galois::invGmixColumn(unsigned char*) [5] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                5.42    6.97  262144/262144      galois::decrypt() [3] 
[6]     32.9    5.42    6.97  262144         
margolis::doGenerations(int) [6] 
                6.97    0.00 6071776/6071776     margolis::swap(int, 
int, int, int) [7] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                6.97    0.00 6071776/6071776     
margolis::doGenerations(int) [6] 
[7]     18.5    6.97    0.00 6071776         margolis::swap(int, int, 
int, int) [7] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                                                 <spontaneous> 
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[8]      0.2    0.07    0.00                 galois::mixColumns() [8] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                                                 <spontaneous> 
[9]      0.1    0.02    0.00                 margolisSingle::swap(int, 
int, int, int) [9] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                                                 <spontaneous> 
[10]     0.0    0.01    0.00                 galois::invShiftRows() 
[10] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                0.00    0.00       4/4           
galois::textUserPrompt() [22] 
[17]     0.0    0.00    0.00       4         void std::fill<char*, 
int>(char*, char*, int const&) [17] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                0.00    0.00       2/2           
galois::verifyGenerators() [23] 
[18]     0.0    0.00    0.00       2         std::hex(std::ios_base&) 
[18] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                0.00    0.00       1/1           __do_global_ctors_aux 
[80] 
[19]     0.0    0.00    0.00       1         global constructors keyed 
to _ZN8margolis10setupRulesEv [19] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                0.00    0.00       1/1           galois::initCipher() 
[21] 
[20]     0.0    0.00    0.00       1         galois::expand_key() [20] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                0.00    0.00       1/1           main [1] 
[21]     0.0    0.00    0.00       1         galois::initCipher() [21] 
                0.00    0.00       1/1           
margolis::setParams(unsigned char*, unsigned char*, int, int, int) [24] 
                0.00    0.00       1/1           galois::expand_key() 
[20] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                0.00    0.00       1/1           main [1] 
[22]     0.0    0.00    0.00       1         galois::textUserPrompt() 
[22] 
                0.00    0.00       4/4           void std::fill<char*, 
int>(char*, char*, int const&) [17] 
                0.00    0.00       1/1           
std::dec(std::ios_base&) [25] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                0.00    0.00       1/1           main [1] 
[23]     0.0    0.00    0.00       1         galois::verifyGenerators() 
[23] 
                0.00    0.00       2/2           
std::hex(std::ios_base&) [18] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                0.00    0.00       1/1           galois::initCipher() 
[21] 
[24]     0.0    0.00    0.00       1         
margolis::setParams(unsigned char*, unsigned char*, int, int, int) [24] 
----------------------------------------------- 
                0.00    0.00       1/1           
galois::textUserPrompt() [22] 
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Index by function name 
 
  [19] global constructors keyed to _ZN8margolis10setupRulesEv [10] 
galois::invShiftRows() [6] margolis::doGenerations(int) 
   [9] margolisSingle::swap(int, int, int, int) [5] 
galois::invGmixColumn(unsigned char*) [7] margolis::swap(int, int, int, 
int) 
  [20] galois::expand_key()   [22] galois::textUserPrompt() [24] 
margolis::setParams(unsigned char*, unsigned char*, int, int, int) 
  [21] galois::initCipher()    [2] galois::doEncryptDecrypt() [25] 
std::dec(std::ios_base&) 
   [8] galois::mixColumns()   [23] galois::verifyGenerators() [18] 
std::hex(std::ios_base&) 
   [4] galois::doInvRounds()   [3] galois::decrypt()      [17] void 
std::fill<char*, int>(char*, char*, int const&) 
 




Cond Entropy = 0 
EntropyX = 4.49714 
EntropyY = 4.49714 
X: moby-dick.dat 
Y: moby-dick-ciph-AESCA1-sbox-only.dat 
Cond Entropy = 4.35398 
EntropyX = 4.49714 
EntropyY = 7.98982 
X: moby-dick.dat 
Y: moby-dick-ciph-aesca2-sbox-only.dat 
Cond Entropy = 4.4135 
EntropyX = 4.49714 
EntropyY = 7.99565 
X: moby-dick.dat 
Y: moby-dick-ciph-aesca5-sbox-only.dat 
Cond Entropy = 4.4412 
EntropyX = 4.49714 
EntropyY = 7.99826 
X: moby-dick.dat 
Y: moby-dick-ciph-aesca10-sbox-only.dat 
Cond Entropy = 4.44154 
EntropyX = 4.49714 
EntropyY = 7.99865 
X: moby-dick.dat 
Y: moby-dick-ciph-aesca50-sbox-only.dat 
Cond Entropy = 4.46575 
EntropyX = 4.49714 
EntropyY = 7.99917 
 




   ULISCAN.c   ---blocksize of 8 
 
1 Oct 98 
1 Dec 98 
21 Dec 98        
uliscan.c derived from ueli8.c 
This version has // comments removed for Sun cc 
This implements Ueli M Maurer's 
"Universal Statistical Test for Random Bit Generators" 
using L=8 
Accepts a filename on the command line; 
writes its results, with other info, to stdout. 
Handles input file exhaustion gracefully. 
Ref: J. Cryptology v 5 no 2, 1992 pp 89-105 






        ULISCAN filename 
        outputs to stdout 
*/ 
 
#define L 8 
#define V (1<<L) 
#define Q (10*V) 
#define K (100   *Q) 






int main(int argc, char **argv) 
{ 
  FILE *fptr; 
  int i,j; 
  int b, c; 
  int table[V]; 
  double sum = 0.0; 
  int iproduct = 1; 
  int run; 
 
  printf("Uliscan 21 Dec 98 \nL=%d %d %d \n", L, V, MAXSAMP); 
 
  if (argc < 2) { 
    printf("Usage: Uliscan filename\n"); 
    exit(-1); 
  } else { 
    printf("Measuring file %s\n", argv[1]); 
  } 
 
  fptr = fopen(argv[1],"rb"); 
 
  if (fptr == NULL) { 
    printf("Can't find %s\n", argv[1]); 
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    exit(-1); 
  } 
 
  for (i = 0; i < V; i++) { 
    table[i] = 0; 
  } 
 
  for (i = 0; i < Q; i++) { 
    b = fgetc(fptr); 
    table[b] = i; 
  } 
 
  printf("Init done\n"); 
 
  printf("Expected value for L=8 is 7.1836656\n"); 
 
  run = 1; 
 
  while (run) { 
    sum = 0.0; 
    iproduct = 1; 
 
    if (run) 
      for (i = Q; run && i < Q + K; i++) { 
        j = i; 
        b = fgetc(fptr); 
 
        if (b < 0) 
          run = 0; 
 
        if (run) { 
          if (table[b] > j) 
            j += K; 
 
          sum += log((double)(j-table[b])); 
 
          table[b] = i; 
        } 
      } 
 
    if (!run) 
      printf("Premature end of file; read %d blocks.\n", i - Q); 
 
    sum = (sum/((double)(i - Q))) /  log(2.0); 
    printf("%4.4f ", sum); 
 
    for (i = 0; i < (int)(sum*8.0 + 0.50); i++) 
      printf("-"); 
 
    printf("\n"); 
 
    /* refill initial table */ 
    if (0) { 
      for (i = 0; i < Q; i++) { 
        b = fgetc(fptr); 
        if (b < 0) { 
          run = 0; 
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        } else { 
          table[b] = i; 
        } 
      } 
    } 
  } 
} 
 
Uliscan 21 Dec 98  
L=8 256 258560  
Measuring file moby-dick.dat 
Init done 




Uliscan 21 Dec 98  
L=8 256 258560  
Measuring file moby-dick-ciph-aes-sbox-only.dat 
Init done 




Uliscan 21 Dec 98  
L=8 256 258560  
Measuring file moby-dick-ciph-aesca1-sbox-only.dat 
Init done 




Uliscan 21 Dec 98  
L=8 256 258560  
Measuring file moby-dick-ciph-aesca2-sbox-only.dat 
Init done 




Uliscan 21 Dec 98  
L=8 256 258560  
Measuring file moby-dick-ciph-aesca5-sbox-only.dat 
Init done 




Uliscan 21 Dec 98  
L=8 256 258560  
Measuring file moby-dick-ciph-aesca10-sbox-only.dat 
Init done 





Uliscan 21 Dec 98  
L=8 256 258560  
Measuring file moby-dick-ciph-aesca50-sbox-only.dat 
Init done 





C11.  Conditional Entropy Results 
 




Cond Entropy = 4.18532 
EntropyX = 4.4147 
EntropyY = 7.99284 
X: magna-carta.dat 
Y: magna-carta-ciph-AES.dat 
Cond Entropy = 4.06934 
EntropyX = 4.4147 
EntropyY = 7.99436 
X: magna-carta.dat 
Y: magna-carta-ciph-AESCA1.dat 
Cond Entropy = 4.12997 
EntropyX = 4.4147 
EntropyY = 7.99384 
X: magna-carta.dat 
Y: magna-carta-ciph-AESCA2.dat 
Cond Entropy = 4.06829 
EntropyX = 4.4147 
EntropyY = 7.99345 
X: magna-carta.dat 
Y: magna-carta-ciph-AESCA3.dat 
Cond Entropy = 4.10717 
EntropyX = 4.4147 
EntropyY = 7.99404 
X: magna-carta.dat 
Y: magna-carta-ciph-AESCA4.dat 
Cond Entropy = 4.14187 
EntropyX = 4.4147 
EntropyY = 7.99505 
X: magna-carta.dat 
Y: magna-carta-ciph-AESCA5.dat 
Cond Entropy = 4.07648 
EntropyX = 4.4147 
EntropyY = 7.99389 
X: magna-carta.dat 
Y: magna-carta-ciph-AESCA10.dat 
Cond Entropy = 4.15784 
EntropyX = 4.4147 
EntropyY = 7.9943 
X: moby-dick.dat 
Y: moby-dick-ciph-fakeOTP.dat 
Cond Entropy = 4.48107 
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EntropyX = 4.49714 
EntropyY = 7.99972 
X: moby-dick.dat 
Y: moby-dick-ciph-AES.dat 
Cond Entropy = 4.47943 
EntropyX = 4.49714 
EntropyY = 7.99973 
X: moby-dick.dat 
Y: moby-dick-ciph-AESCA1.dat 
Cond Entropy = 4.46895 
EntropyX = 4.49714 
EntropyY = 7.99973 
X: moby-dick.dat 
Y: moby-dick-ciph-AESCA2.dat 
Cond Entropy = 4.46718 
EntropyX = 4.49714 
EntropyY = 7.99973 
X: moby-dick.dat 
Y: moby-dick-ciph-AESCA3.dat 
Cond Entropy = 4.47666 
EntropyX = 4.49714 
EntropyY = 7.99969 
X: moby-dick.dat 
Y: moby-dick-ciph-AESCA4.dat 
Cond Entropy = 4.47919 
EntropyX = 4.49714 
EntropyY = 7.99974 
X: moby-dick.dat 
Y: moby-dick-ciph-AESCA5.dat 
Cond Entropy = 4.47805 
EntropyX = 4.49714 
EntropyY = 7.99974 
X: moby-dick.dat 
Y: moby-dick-ciph-AESCA10.dat 
Cond Entropy = 4.46592 
EntropyX = 4.49714 
EntropyY = 7.99972 
 
C12.  Compression Test Results 
 
Uncompressed Results 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  29824 2007-05-21 23:22 magna-carta-ciph-AES.dat 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  29824 2007-05-21 23:22 magna-carta-ciph-AESCA1.dat 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  29824 2007-05-21 23:23 magna-carta-ciph-AESCA10.dat 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  29824 2007-05-21 23:23 magna-carta-ciph-AESCA2.dat 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  29824 2007-05-21 23:23 magna-carta-ciph-AESCA3.dat 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  29824 2007-05-21 23:23 magna-carta-ciph-AESCA4.dat 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  29824 2007-05-21 23:23 magna-carta-ciph-AESCA5.dat 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  29824 2007-05-22 00:13 magna-carta-ciph-fakeOTP.dat 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  29824 2007-05-21 21:59 magna-carta.dat 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 643232 2007-05-21 23:20 moby-dick-ciph-AES.dat 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 643232 2007-05-21 23:21 moby-dick-ciph-AESCA1.dat 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 643232 2007-05-21 23:24 moby-dick-ciph-AESCA10.dat 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 643232 2007-05-21 23:21 moby-dick-ciph-AESCA2.dat 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 643232 2007-05-21 23:21 moby-dick-ciph-AESCA3.dat 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 643232 2007-05-21 23:21 moby-dick-ciph-AESCA4.dat 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 643232 2007-05-21 23:21 moby-dick-ciph-AESCA5.dat 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 643232 2007-05-22 00:51 moby-dick-ciph-fakeOTP.dat 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 643232 2007-05-21 23:18 moby-dick.dat 
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Compressed Bzip2 Results 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  30304 2007-05-21 23:22 magna-carta-ciph-AES.dat.bz2 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  30302 2007-05-21 23:22 magna-carta-ciph-AESCA1.dat.bz2 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  30303 2007-05-21 23:23 magna-carta-ciph-AESCA10.dat.bz2 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  30317 2007-05-21 23:23 magna-carta-ciph-AESCA2.dat.bz2 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  30304 2007-05-21 23:23 magna-carta-ciph-AESCA3.dat.bz2 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  30316 2007-05-21 23:23 magna-carta-ciph-AESCA4.dat.bz2 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  30317 2007-05-21 23:23 magna-carta-ciph-AESCA5.dat.bz2 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users  30319 2007-05-22 00:13 magna-carta-ciph-fakeOTP.dat.bz2 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users   9638 2007-05-21 21:59 magna-carta.dat.bz2 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 646597 2007-05-21 23:20 moby-dick-ciph-AES.dat.bz2 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 646299 2007-05-21 23:21 moby-dick-ciph-AESCA1.dat.bz2 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 646375 2007-05-21 23:24 moby-dick-ciph-AESCA10.dat.bz2 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 646345 2007-05-21 23:21 moby-dick-ciph-AESCA2.dat.bz2 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 646698 2007-05-21 23:21 moby-dick-ciph-AESCA3.dat.bz2 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 646678 2007-05-21 23:21 moby-dick-ciph-AESCA4.dat.bz2 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 646576 2007-05-21 23:21 moby-dick-ciph-AESCA5.dat.bz2 
-rw-r--r-- 1 shambler users 646571 2007-05-22 00:51 moby-dick-ciph-fakeOTP.dat.bz2 














#define HEIGHT 64 
#define WIDTH 64 
#define size 4 
 





bool evenodd = true; 
 
#define getCell(x,y) (test[fixX(x)+fixY(y)*WIDTH]) 
#define fixX(x) ((WIDTH + (x))%WIDTH) 
#define fixY(y) ((HEIGHT + (y))%HEIGHT) 
 
void swap(int x1,int y1,int x2,int y2) 
{ 
    swapCount++; 
    uint8_t temp = getCell(x1,y1); 
    getCell(x1,y1) = getCell(x2,y2); 
    getCell(x2,y2) = temp; 
} 
 
#define swapDiag1(x,y) swap(x,y,x+1,y+1) 
#define swapDiag2(x,y) swap(x+1,y,x,y+1) 
#define swapHoriz1(x,y) swap(x,y,x+1,y) 
#define swapHoriz2(x,y) swap(x,y+1,x+1,y+1) 
#define swapVert1(x,y) swap(x,y,x,y+1) 
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#define swapVert2(x,y) swap(x+1,y,x+1,y+1) 
 
enum{SCREENWIDTH = WIDTH*size, SCREENHEIGHT = HEIGHT*size, 




using namespace std; 
 
#define T true 
#define F false 
 






void doTransition(int x, int y, uint8_t currState) 
{ 
    for (int i=0;i<6;i++) 
    { 
        if (rules[currState][i]) 
        { 
            switch (i) 
            { 
            case 0: 
                swapDiag1(x, y); 
                break; 
            case 1: 
                swapDiag2(x,y); 
                break; 
            case 2: 
                swapHoriz1(x,y); 
                break; 
            case 3: 
                swapHoriz2(x,y); 
                break; 
            case 4: 
                swapVert1(x,y); 
                break; 
            case 5: 
                swapVert2(x,y); 
                break; 
            } 
        } 





    srand(time(0)); 
    for (int i=0;i<HEIGHT;i++) 
    { 
        for (int j=0;j<WIDTH;j++) 
        { 
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            //test[i*WIDTH+j] = 
128;//j/(float)WIDTH*256;//rand()%255;//rand()%127; 
            if (i>= HEIGHT/4 && i < HEIGHT-HEIGHT/4 && j >= WIDTH/4 && 
j < WIDTH-WIDTH/4) test[i*WIDTH+j] = 128 + rand()%128; 
        } 
    } 
    //test[1600] = 0xff; 




#define getConfiguration(i,j) ((getCell(i+1,j+1)>thresh?8:0) + 





    evenodd ^= 1; 
    for (int i=evenodd;i<HEIGHT;i+=2) 
    { 
        for (int j=evenodd;j<WIDTH;j+=2) 
        { 
            doTransition(i, j, getConfiguration(i,j)); 
        } 










    for (int i=0;i<HEIGHT;i++) 
    { 
        for (int j=0;j<WIDTH;j++) 
        { 
            uint8_t c = getCell(i,j); 
            if (c > 127) 
            { 
                
boxRGBA(pSurface,i*size,j*size,(i+1)*size,(j+1)*size,255,255,255,255); 
            } 
            else 
boxRGBA(pSurface,i*size,j*size,(i+1)*size,(j+1)*size,0,0,0,255); 
        } 





    srand(time(0)); 
    for (int i=0;i<16;i++) 
        for (int j=0;j<6;j++) 
        { 
            rules[i][j] = 0; 
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            rules[i][j] = rand()%50>25?T:F; 
        } 
} 
 
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) 
{ 
    initMap(); 
 
    if (SDL_Init(SDL_INIT_VIDEO) < 0) 
    { 
        cout << "Error Initializing SDL Video" << endl; 
        SDL_Quit(); 
        return 1; 
    } 
    pSurface = SDL_SetVideoMode ( SCREENWIDTH , SCREENHEIGHT ,SCREENBPP 
, SCREENFLAGS ) ; 
 
    while (1) 
    { 
        //nextGeneration(); 
        draw(); 
        SDL_Flip(pSurface); 
        //SDL_Delay(40); 
 
        SDL_PollEvent(&keyEvent); 
        switch (keyEvent.type) 
        { 
        case SDL_KEYDOWN: 
            switch (keyEvent.key.keysym.sym) 
            { 
            case SDLK_DOWN: 
                SDL_Quit(); 
                return 0; 
                break; 
            case SDLK_UP: 
                randomThresh(); 
                break; 
            case SDLK_LEFT: 
                //initMap(); 
                randomRules(); 
                break; 
            case SDLK_RIGHT: 
                SDL_SaveBMP(pSurface, "test.bmp"); 
                break; 
            case SDLK_SPACE: 
                //evenodd ^= 1; 
                for(int i=0;i<5;i++) 
                { 
                    nextGeneration(); 
                    draw(); 
                    SDL_Flip(pSurface); 
                } 
                break; 
            } 
            break; 
        } 




    } 
 
    system("PAUSE"); 
    SDL_Quit(); 









7.  DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT 
 
Slackware Linux 11.0: 
Bash 3.1.17 
GNU Nano Editor 1.3.12 
GCC 3.4.6 
GNU gprof 2.15.92.0.2 
Windows XP SP2: 









Microsoft Excel  
Microsoft Visio 
Microsoft Paint 
PDF Creator 
